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ABSTRACT
In this Article, Professor Brower examines the investment
chapter of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
He argues that the relevant treaty provisions lack a substantial
measure of textual clarity. In addition, he argues that ad hoc
tribunals based on the commercial arbitration model have
generated incoherent doctrine and are relatively less
accountable, transparent, and accessible than permanent
tribunals. Furthermore, he argues that the NAFTA Parties and
their courts so far appear to place a higher priority on the
pursuit of narrow self-interest than on the principled
administration of international governance. Collectively, these
circumstances help to explain the frequency and intensity with
which claimants, tribunals, and the NAFTA Parties refer to the
perceived illegitimacy of investor-state arbitration under
NAFTA. While superior proposals may emerge, Professor
Brower suggests that mitigation of this legitimacy crisis may
require the continuation of ad hoc arbitration, followed by
review by a standing appellate body and supervised by an
accountable, transparent Free Trade Commission.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Debates about the investment chapter-Chapter 11--of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)1 have become
common fare. 2  From these discussions, however, a surprising
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch.
11, 32 I.L.M. 605, 639-49 [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. See, e.g., Charles H. Brower, H, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTFA The
Empire Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 44 (2001) [hereinafter Brower, Empire
Strikes Back]; J.C. Thomas, A Reply to Professor Brower, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 433,
434-35 (2002); Charles H. Brower, II, Beware the Jabberwock: A Reply to Mr. Thomas, 40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 465, 465 (2002) [hereinafter Brewer, Beware the Jabberwock]. See
also Ari Afilalo, Constitutionalization Through the Back Door: A European Perspective on
NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT' L. & POL. 1, 3 (2001) (indicating that
"Chapter 11 has generated enormous controversy"); Stephen Clarkson, Systemic or
Surgical?: Possible Cures for NAFTA's Investor-State Dispute Process, 36 CAN. BUS. L.J. 368,
369 (2002) (mentioning Chapter ll's "high potential for continuing controversy); Julie
Soloway & Jeremy Broadhurst, What's in the Medicine Chest for Chapter 1I's ills?, 36 CAN.
Bus. L.J. 388, 388 (2002) (mentioning the existence of "widespread allegations from both
inside and outside the trade law community that (NAF'A's investment chapter] is sick and
in desperate need of very powerful medication'); Gus van Harten, Guatemala's Peace
Accords in a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 113, 142 (2000)
(observing that NAFTA's investment chapter has been "the subject of a great debate); Joel
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phenomenon has emerged-namely, the intensity and sincerity with
which claimants, the NAFTA Parties, and tribunals accuse one
another of illegitimate conduct in the course of arbitrating investment
disputes. Left unresolved, such widespread and enduring perceptions
bode ill for the future of investor-state arbitration under NAFTA and
the extension of a similar investment regime to the entire Western
hemisphere through an Agreement on the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA).3 To redress the troubling state of affairs, this
Article initiates a discourse about the sources of perceived
illegitimacy in Chapter 11 disputes, as well as the means for their
C. Beauvais, Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA Emerging Principles and Lingering
Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 246 (2002) (mentioning the "storm of controversy"
created by Chapter 11); Marc Lalonde, When Investor Rights Go Too Far, TORONTO STAR,
May 1, 2002, at B1, available at 2002 WL 17993459 (recognizing that "[n]o part of the North
American Free Trade Agreement ...has generated more controversy than the foreign
investor rights provisions in Chapter 11 of the agreement).
3. See Draft Agreement on the Free Trade Area for the Americas, Chapter on
Investment, FTAA.TNC/w/133/Rev.1, July 3, 2001, available at http://www.ftaa-
alca.org. See also van Harten, supra note 2, at 140 (reporting that "[t]he U.S.
Government . . . has forcefully advanced the NAFTA investment provisions as a
prototype for the FTAA"); Beauvais, supra note 2, at 255 (predicting that some form of
NAFTA's investment Chapter "will be incorporated into the Free Trade Agreement for
the Americas"); Howard Mann & Konrad von Moltke, Protecting Investor Rights and
the Public Good: Assessing NAFTA's Investment Chapter 2 (Mar. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, prepared for Investment Law and Sustainable Development Tri-National
Policy Workshops), at http://www.iisd.org/trade/ilsdworkshop/pdflbackground-en.pdf
[hereinafter Mann & von Moltke, manuscript] (observing that "Chapter 11 has
provided the template for the initial stages of investment negotiations in the Free
Trade Area of the Americas process"). Cf. David A. Gantz, Resolution of Investment
Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
335, 335, 348 (1993) (recognizing that Chapter 11 might serve as a model for similar
arrangements); Todd Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of
International Economic Law, 36 CAN. Bus. L.J. 405, 408 (2002) (predicting that "North
America will likely be seen as the petri dish" for the emergence of a uniform body of
international economic law).
Concerns about the operation of Chapter 11 prompted the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development to abandon negotiations on a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998. See HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE,
NAFTA's CHAPTER 11 AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7, 11, 15 (1999) [hereinafter MANN &
VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11]; Bernardo M. Cremades & David J.A. Cairns, The
Brave New World of Global Arbitration, 3 J. WORLD INV. 173, 180 (2002); Robert K.
Paterson, A New Pandora's Box?: Private Remedies for Foreign Investors Under the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DiSp. RESOL. 77,
105-06 (2000); Pierre Sauve, Canada, Free Trade, and the Diminishing Returns of
Hemispheric Regionalism, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 237, 244 (1999-2000);
Julie A. Soloway, NAFTA's Chapter 11: The Challenge of Private Party Participation,
16 J. INT'L ARB. 1, 2-3 (1999) [hereinafter Soloway, Challenge of Private Party
Participation]; Julie A. Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers Under NAFTA: The
MMT Fuel Additives Controversy, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 55, 88 (1999) [hereinafter
Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers Under NAFTA]; Beauvais, supra note 2, at
255. Some observers believe that perceived abuses of the Chapter 11 process "put at
even greater risk the eventual adoption of a hemispheric trade pact." Lalonde, supra
note 2.
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mitigation in future investment regimes. Laying the foundation for
this analysis, Part II reviews the purpose, structure, and early
operation of NAFTA's investment chapter. Part III examines the
nature of legitimacy and identifies the factors that support
perceptions of legitimacy in international legal regimes. Building on
Parts II and III, Part IV explains why NAFTA's investment chapter
generates widespread accusations of illegitimate conduct by
claimants, states parties, and arbitral tribunals. Finally, with an eye
towards improving the performance of multilateral investment
regimes, Part V assesses proposals for reform against the necessary
criteria for generating perceptions of legitimacy, as well as advancing
the more specific goals of investment regimes.
II. PURPOSE, STRUCTURE, AND EARLY OPERATION OF CHAPTER 11
When ratifying NAFTA, Canada, Mexico and the United States
undertook to "[ensure] a predictable commercial framework for
business planning and investment,' 4  "increase substantially
investment opportunities in the[ir] territories," 5 and "create effective
procedures for . . . the resolution of disputes"6-all in a manner
consistent with "environmental protection and conservation, ' 7
preservation of their "flexibility to safeguard the public welfare,"8 and
promotion of "sustainable development."9  Chapter 11 implements
these objectives by establishing standards for treatment of investors
and adopting procedures for resolving investor-state disputes. 10
For example, Section A of Chapter 11 defines the scope and
content of investment disciplines accepted by the NAFTA Parties.
With respect to scope, the disciplines of Section A apply to "measures
adopted or maintained by a [NAFTA] Party relating to" the investors
of another NAFTA Party, as well as the investments of investors of
another NAFTA Party located in the territory of the host state."
Substantively, Section A permits direct expropriation, indirect
expropriation, and measures "tantamount to . .. expropriation" of
investments only for a public purpose, on a nondiscriminatory basis,
in accordance with due process of law and the minimum standard of
treatment under Chapter 11, and upon prompt payment of fair
4. NAFTA, supra note 1, pmbl.
5. Id. art. 102(1)(c).
6. Id. art. 102(1)(e).
7. Id. pmbl.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Charles H. Brower, II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA A Tale of
Fear and Equilibrium, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 43, 46 (2001).
11. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1101(1).
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market value-plus interest-in freely-transferable funds. 12  In
addition, Section A prohibits certain performance requirements,
including requirements to export a given level or percentage of goods
or services, or to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic
content. 13 Furthermore, Section A requires the NAFTA Parties to
treat each others' investors in accordance with the relative standards
of national treatment and most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment. 14
Finally, Section A establishes a minimum standard of treatment,
which mandates treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment. 15
Unlike the World Trade Organization's (WTO) disciplines on
trade in goods, Chapter 11 does not, except with respect to
performance requirements, 16 incorporate general exceptions for
measures necessary to protect public morals; necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life, or health; or relating to the conservation
of natural resources. 17 Nevertheless, two provisions of Chapter 11
recognize that the NAFTA Parties may undertake public health
"functions" and may adopt, maintain, or enforce measures they
consider "appropriate" to ensure that investments proceed "in a
manner sensitive to environmental concerns"-all provided that the
functions and measures remain consistent with their obligations
under NAFTA's investment chapter.' 8 Although these provisions
evidently have some effect on the NAFTA Parties' rights and
obligations, 19 their ambiguous text leaves their relationship to
investment disciplines largely unresolved. 20
12. See id. art. 1110(1)-(6).
13. See id. art. 1106(1)(a)-(b), (3)(b).
14. See id. arts. 1102, 1103.
15. See id. art. 1105(1).
16. See id. art. 1106(6).
17. Compare General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX, 61
Stat. 5, A3, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (establishing such general exceptions), with
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2101 (incorporating the GATs general exceptions with respect
to trade in goods, but not investment). See also INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND, PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS 12 (2001) [hereinafter PRIVATE
RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS]; Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and
Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 141, 151-52 (2002); Todd
Weiler, A First Look at the Interim Merits Award in S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada: It Is
Possible to Balance Legitimate Environmental Concerns with Investment Protection, 24
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 173, 181 (2001); Beauvais, supra note 2, at 266; Samrat
Ganguly, The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (IDSM) and a Sovereign's Power to Protect
Public Health, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 113, 125 (1999); MANN & VON MOLTKE,
NAFTA'S CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 11.
18. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1101(4), 1114(1).
19. See, e.g., Cayuga Indians Claims (U.K. v. U.S.), 73 R.I.A.A. 173, 176 (1926)
("[I]t is a principle of interpretation recognized in all systems of law that a clause must
be so interpreted as to give a meaning rather than so as to deprive it of a meaning."); I
SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 861 (7th ed. 1948) ("It is
to be taken for granted that the parties intend the stipulations of a treaty to have a
certain effect, and not to be meaningless. Therefore, an interpretation is not
42 VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
In order to secure the rights and obligations just described,
Section B of Chapter 11 "establishes a mechanism for the settlement
of investment disputes that assures both equal treatment among
investors of the Parties in accordance with the principle of
international reciprocity and due process before an impartial
tribunal. ' 21 To this end, Section B memorializes the NAFTA Parties'
standing consent to investor-state arbitration.22  Their consent
represents a permanent offer,23 which investors may accept by
submitting disputes to: (1) arbitration under the ICSID Convention, if
the investor's home state and the disputing NAFTA Party are both
states parties to that convention; 24 (2) the Additional Facility Rules of
ICSID, if either the investor's home state or the disputing NAFTA
Party is a state party to the ICSID Convention; or (3) the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules. 25 As a condition precedent to the submission of
claims, however, investors must execute their own written consents
to arbitration. Investors must also waive their right to initiate or
continue any other dispute resolution proceedings with respect to the
allegedly offending measure, except for certain proceedings for
extraordinary relief not involving the payment of damages.
26
Investors who initiate claims on behalf of owned or controlled
enterprises located in another NAFTA Party must also submit
admissible which would make a stipulation meaningless, or ineffective."). But see
PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 12 (indicating that Article
1114(1) "is not particularly meaningful"); Paterson, supra note 3, at 105 (suggesting
that Article 1114 is "largely meaningless"); Weiler, supra note 17, at 181-82 (describing
Article 1114 as a "hortatory environmental provision" that cannot "override mandatory
treaty obligations").
20. See Tollefson, supra note 17, at 151.
21. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1115.
22. See id. art. 1122(1).
23. See In re Arbitration Pursuant to Chapter Eleven of NAF'A Between
Metalclad Corp. & United Mexican States, Petitioner's Outline of Argument, Feb. 5, 2001,
para. 224 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Mexico's Outline of
Argument (Metalclad)]; Cremades & Cairns, supra note 3, at 184; J. Christopher Thomas,
Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 1999 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 99, 113.
24. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1120(1). The "ICSID Convention" means the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention]. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1139. Presently, the United States is a
state party to the ICSID Convention, but Canada and Mexico are not. See Ethyl Corp.
v. Canada, Decision Regarding the Place of Arbitration, Nov. 28, 1997, 38 I.L.M. 702,
703 n.5 (1999); Paterson, supra note 3, at 107; Chris Tollefson, Metalclad v. United
Mexican States Revisited: Judicial Oversight of NAFTA's Chapter Eleven Investor.
State Claim Process, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 183, 198 (2002).
25. The "UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules" mean the U.N. Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N.
Commission on International Trade Law, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, ch. V, sec. C, U.N.
Doc. A/31/17 (1976). See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1139.
26. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1121(1).
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waivers executed by those enterprises. 27 Article 1122(2) recognizes
that, when taken together, the treaty-based consent of NAFTA
Parties and the submission of claims by investors satisfy the
requirements for written arbitration agreements under the ICSID
Convention, the New York Convention, 28 and the Inter-American
Convention. 2
9
Once submitted to arbitration, the institutional rules selected by
the investor govern the proceedings, except as modified by Section B
of Chapter 11.30 Section B modifies the arbitration rules, inter alia,
by creating a limited right of audience for non-disputing NAFTA
Parties and identifying the proper law for Chapter 11 disputes. Thus,
Articles 1127 and 1129 entitle non-disputing NAFTA Parties to
receive copies of all pleadings, evidence, and written arguments. 3
1
Article 1128 also grants non-disputing NAFTA Parties the right to
make submissions to Chapter 11 tribunals regarding the
interpretation of NAFTA. 32 Article 1131(1) requires tribunals to
render decisions in accordance with NAFTA and other "applicable
rules of international law.' ' 33  Tribunals must also apply
interpretations of NAFTA made by the Free Trade Commission-the
three NAFTA Parties acting in concert through cabinet-level
representatives. 34
With respect to the binding effect, judicial supervision, and
enforcement of Chapter 11 awards, Article 1136 establishes three
relevant principles. First, awards "have no binding force except
between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular case."
35
Second, prevailing parties may not seek enforcement of awards
rendered under the Additional Facility or UNCITRAL Rules until
either (1) three months have passed without the losing party having
27. Id. art. 1121(2). In addition, investors cannot submit a claim to arbitration
until six months have elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim. Id. art. 1120(1).
Before actually submitting a claim, investors must also wait for 90 days after giving
the disputing NAFTA Party notice of intent to submit the claim to arbitration. Id. art.
1119. Finally, investors may not submit a claim to arbitration if more than three years
have elapsed from the date on which the investor acquired (or should have acquired)
knowledge both of the alleged breach and the occurrence of loss or damage. See id.
arts. 1116(2), 1117(2).
28. The "New York Convention" means the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S.
38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1139.
29. The "Inter-American Convention" means the Inter-American Convention on
Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 104 Stat. 448 (1990), O.A.S. Treaty Series no.
42, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975) [hereinafter Inter-American Convention]. See
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1139.
30. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1120(2).
31. See id. arts. 1127, 1129.
32. See id. art. 1128.
33. Id. art. 1131(1).
34. See id. art. 1131(2).
35. Id. art. 1136(1) (emphasis added).
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initiated a proceeding to revise, set aside, or annul the award, or (2) a
court has dismissed or allowed such a proceeding and there is no
further appeal. 36 This provision evidently gives the losing parties an
opportunity to seek revision or annulment of Chapter 11 awards by
municipal courts at the seat of arbitration.37 Third, investors may, as
appropriate, seek enforcement of awards under the ICSID
Convention, the New York Convention, or the Inter-American
Convention. 38 For the purposes of the New York Convention and the
Inter-American Convention, Chapter 11 proceedings "shall be
considered to arise out of a commercial relationship.
39
Regular observers of international investment law will note that
Chapter 11 bears a family resemblance to bilateral investment
treaties (BITs).40 Yet, while Chapter 11 largely adopts the familiar
structure of BITs, it projects that framework onto a novel setting:41
one in which the substantive and procedural obligations govern the
relations between two developed states-Canada and the United
States-with mature regulatory systems and a significant, reciprocal
volume of cross-border investment.4 2 As a result, NAFTA investors
36. See id. art. 1136(3).
37. See Henri C. Alvarez, Arbitration Under the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 16 ARB. INT'L 393, 418 (2000); Thomas, supra note 23, at 109 & n.34.
38. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1136(6).
39. Id. art. 1136(7).
40. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000), paras. 58-77
(separate opinion of Bryan Schwartz) available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/
4b2myers.htm [hereinafter S.D. Myers, Partial Award]; Michael P. Avramovich, The
Protection of International Investment at the Start of the Twenty-First Century: Will
Anachronistic Notions of Business Render Irrelevant the OECD's Multilateral
Agreement on Investment?, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1201, 1240-41 (1998); Charles N.
Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing the International Rule
of Law Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 193, 193-94 (2001); David A. Gantz,
Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and Environmental Regulation Under
NAFTA's Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 651, 653, 671 (2001); Gantz, supra
note 3, at 339; Lawrence L. Herman, Settlement of International Trade Disputes-
Challenges to Sovereignty-A Canadian Perspective, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 121, 133 (1998);
Paterson, supra note 3, at 85; Soloway, Challenge of Private Party Participation, supra
note 3, at 4; van Harten, supra note 2, at 137; David R. Adair, Comment, Investors'
Rights: The Evolutionary Process of Investment Treaties, 6 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
195, 204 (1999); Christopher N. Camponovo, Dispute Settlement and the OECD
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 181, 195
(1996); Julia Ferguson, California's MTBE Contaminated Water: An Illustration of the
Need for an Environmental Interpretive Note on Article 1110 of NAFTA, 11 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL L. & POL'Y 499, 502 (2000); Ganguly, supra note 17, at 132-33; Tali Levy,
NAFTA's Provision for Compensation in the Event of Expropriation: A Reassessment of
the "Prompt, Adequate and Effective" Standard, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 423, 445, 446-47
(1995).
41. See Brower, supra note 10, at 47; Brower & Steven, supra note 40, at 194-
95.
42. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA'S CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 4;
Brower & Steven, supra note 40, at 195; Gantz, supra note 40, at 672; Daniel M. Price,
An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State
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can now require the governments of Canada and the United States to
satisfy the heavy obligations normally thrust upon developing states
in BITs.4 3
Although virtually no one foresaw Chapter l's capacity to
interfere with the legislative, executive, and judicial systems of the
NAFTA Parties, particularly Canada and the United States,44
investors have now submitted almost 20 claims, 45 which seek billions
of dollars in damages; challenge measures that ostensibly protect
public health, safety, and the environment; and attack the legitimacy
of important governmental services, including the state judicial
systems of Massachusetts and Mississippi.46  This unexpected
proliferation of claims has disturbed many observers who continue to
denounce the purportedly "aggressive 4 7  use of investor-state
Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW. 727, 731 (1993) [hereinafter Price, Overview of the
NAFTA Investment Chapter]; Daniel M. Price, Towards an Effective International
Investment Regime, Remarks, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 485, 492 (1997); Tollefson,
supra note 17, at 143; Sabrina Safrin et al., International Legal Developments in
Review: 1999: Public International Law/Environmental Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 707, 723
(2000).
43. Brower, supra note 10, at 47; Price, Overview of the NAFTA Investment
Chapter, supra note 42, at 736.
44. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 4;
Clarkson, supra note 2, at 378; Herman, supra note 40, at 133-34; Soloway, Challenge
of Private Party Participation, supra note 3, at 4; Soloway, Environmental Trade
Barriers Under NAFTA, supra note 3, at 88; Tollefson, supra note 17, at 146; Ferguson,
supra note 40, at 503. But see Richard G. Dearden, Arbitration of Expropriation
Disputes Between an Investor and the State Under the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 113, 114, 126-27 (1995) (predicting the regular use of
Chapter 11 in disputes alleging expropriation and explaining that Chapter 11 fetters
the discretion of NAFTA Parties); Paterson, supra note 3, at 85-86 ("Given the large
scale of inter-NAFTA-Party investment, it was predictable that Chapter 11 would
attract several claims ... ").
45. See, e.g., Tollefson, supra note 17, at 187-88.
46. Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2, at 45. See also Brower, supra
note 10, at 50-51. In two cases, Canadian investors have claimed that state court
proceedings in Massachusetts and Mississippi either caused or contributed to
violations of Articles 1102 (national treatment), 1105 (minimum standard of
treatment), and 1110 (measures tantamount to expropriation). See Mondev Int'l Ltd. v.
United States, Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 1, 1999), paras. 127-33, 138-39, 141-48, 150,
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com; Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Notice
of Claim (Oct. 30, 1998), at 2-3, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter
Loewen Group, Notice of Claim]. In another case, United Parcel Service of America,
Inc. claims that the operations of Canada Post (Canada's national mail service) violate
Articles 1102 (national treatment) and 1105 (minimum standard of treatment), and
result in the unlawful use of the letter-mail monopoly to cross-subsidize non-
monopolized services. See United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Notice of Intent
to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Section B of Chapter 11 of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (Jan. 19, 2000), paras. 5-16, 19, 25-31, available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/nafta-e.asp.
47. MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 4; Howard
Mann, NAFTA and the Environment: Lessons for the Future, 13 TUL. ENVT'L L.J. 387,
405-06 (2000); David Runnalls & Howard Mann, Still Time to Fix Flawed Trade Rule,
WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Apr. 30, 2001, at All, available at 2001 WL 16236366. See
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arbitration as an "offensive" weapon 48 that has "chilled"49 the exercise
of regulatory authority and caused an "alarming" loss of
sovereignty.5
0
Despite such expressions of concern, the NAFTA Parties enjoyed
considerable success in responding to the initial wave of Chapter 11
claims. Thus, in two cases, tribunals rendered final or partial-final
awards against the investors. 51  In a third case, the tribunal
also J. Martin Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and Environmental
Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 466 (1999); Daniel R. Loritz, Comment,
Corporate Predators Attack Environmental Regulations: It's Time to Arbitrate Claims
Filed Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, 22 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 533, 534 (2000).
48. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA'S CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 5; Lucien
J. Dhooge, The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Environment: The
Lessons of Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
209, 276 (2001); Mann, supra note 47, at 405; Francisco Nogales, The NAFTA
Environmental Framework, Chapter 11 Investment Provisions, and the Environment, 8
ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 97, 110 (2001); Tollefson, supra note 24, at 184; Ferguson,
supra note 40, at 503; Ganguly, supra note 17, at 153; Runnalls & Mann, supra note
47, at All; Bruce Stokes, Talk About Unintended Consequences!, 33 NAT'L J. 1592,
1592 (2001), available at 2001 WL 7182202. See also PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC
PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 16, 19 (discussing Chapter 11's transformation from
"shield" to "sword"); Beauvais, supra note 2, at 264 (claiming that NAFTA empowers
savvy investors" to use Chapter 11 "as a sword against regulation, rather than a
shield against discriminatory expropriations").
49. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 40, para. 203; PRIVATE RIGHTS,
PUBLIC PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 34; Clarkson, supra note 2, at 379; Mann, supra
note 47, at 406; Tollefson, supra note 17, at 148; Tollefson, supra note 24, at 184-85;
van Harten, supra note 2, at 142; Beauvais, supra note 2, at 246-47; Justin Byrne,
Note, NAFTA Dispute Resolution: Implementing True Rule-Based Diplomacy Through
Direct Access, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 415, 432 (2000); Ferguson, supra note 40, at 500;
Ganguly, supra note 17, at 119; Loritz, supra note 47, at 546; Lalonde, supra note 2.
See also Rainer Geiger, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 467, 471 (1998) (observing that "[e]nvironmental organizations are concerned
about a chilling effect on governmental protection of the environment, resulting from
investor claims that environmental regulation amounts to expropriation").
50. Ganguly, supra note 17, at 126. See also S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra
note 40, paras. 12, 86; Kevin Banks, NAFTA's Article 1110-Can Regulation Be
Expropriation?, 5 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 499, 499 (1999); David A. Gantz,
Reconciling Environmental Protection and Investor Rights Under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA, 31 ENVT'L L. REP. 10646, 10646-47 (2001), available at WESTLAW, 31 ELR
10646; Herman, supra note 40, at 123, 134; Sauve, supra note 3, at 244; Julie A.
Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers Under NAFTA, supra note 3, at 88; Byrne,
supra note 49, at 430; Loritz, supra note 47, at 546-47.
51. See Azinian v. Mexico, Award (Nov. 1, 1999), paras. 93-124, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm [hereinafter Azinian, Award]
(denying a claim that Mexico violated Article 1110 (expropriation) and also finding
proprio motu that Mexico complied with its obligations under Article 1105 (minimum
standard of treatment)); Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award (June 26, 2000),
paras. 64-80, 96-105, available at http://www.appletonlaw.comI4b3P&T.htm
[hereinafter Pope & Talbot, Interim Award] (denying claims that Canadian export
regulations violated Articles 1106 (performance requirements) and 1110
(expropriation)).
In a subsequent award, the Pope & Talbot tribunal also denied numerous claims
that Canadian export regulations violated Articles 1102 (national treatment) and 1105
[VOL. 36.37
20031 STRUCTURE, LEGITIMACY AND NAFTA'SINVESTMENT CHAPTER 47
dismissed the claim on jurisdictional grounds. 52 Four more cases
ended either in the abandonment, withdrawal, or settlement of claims
for relatively modest amounts. 53 More recently, however, Chapter 11
tribunals sitting in Canada issued final or partial-final awards
against Mexico and Canada in Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico,5 4 S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. Canada,5 5 and Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada.56
Stung by this series of defeats, the NAFTA Parties have
apparently launched a two-pronged campaign to assert control over
the Chapter 11 process, to purge their responsibility for liabilities
already imposed, and to immunize themselves against the prospect of
liability in pending matters. 57 First, Mexico sought, and partly
obtained, judicial review of the merits of the Metalclad award from
the Supreme Court of British Columbia. 58 Canada has petitioned its
(minimum standard of treatment). See Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits
of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2001), paras. 83-104, 119-55, 182-85, available at
http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm [hereinafter Pope & Talbot, Award on the
Merits of Phase 2]. Although the tribunal later found that the Canadian government
violated Article 1105 by conducting a vindictive audit procedure during the arbitration
proceedings, the tribunal awarded only $461,666 in damages and the Canadian
government "welcomed" the award as a "decisive[ ]" and "overall" victory. See id. at
paras. 156-81; Dep't of Foreign Aff. and Int'l Trade, News Release: Canada Wins
NAFTA Chapter 11 Dispute (Apr. 10, 2001), available at http://webapps.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/minpubPublication,asp?FileSpec=IMinPubDocs/104070.htm. See also
Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages (May 31, 2002), paras. 87-91,
at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.caltna-nac/damage-award.pdf [hereinafter Pope & Talbot,
Award in Respect of Damages].
52. See Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, Award (June 2, 2000), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsidlcases/awards.htm [hereinafter Waste Mgmt., Award].
53. See Brower, supra note 10, at 48 (discussing the settlement of Ethyl Corp.'s
$251 million claim against Canada for $13 million); Tollefson, supra note 17, at 187-88
(indicating that, as of 2002, three investors abandoned or withdrew their claims).
54. See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award (Aug. 30, 2000), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm [hereinafter Metalclad, Award].
55. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 40.
56. See Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, supra note 51; Pope &
Talbot, Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 51. As noted above, the Pope &
Talbot tribunal ruled in Canada's favor on virtually all points, but found one minor
violation of Article 1105 (minimum standard of treatment) relating to Canada's
behavior during the pendency of the arbitration. See supra note 51.
57. Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 2, at 485.
58. See United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., Reasons for Judgment of
Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, paras. 61-75 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001), available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/trans-2may.pdf [hereinafter Metalclad, Reasons
for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe]; Mexico's Outline of Argument (Metalclad),
supra note 23, paras. 131, 145-66; In re Arbitration Pursuant to Chapter Eleven of
NAFTA Between Metalclad Corp. & United Mexican States, Outline of Argument of
Intervenor Attorney General of Canada (Feb. 16, 2001), paras. 25-27, 30 (B.C. Sup. Ct.
2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/canada submission-e.pdf
[hereinafter Canada's Outline of Argument (Metalclad)]; Brower, Beware the
Jabberwock, supra note 2, at 479-84; Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2, at 61-
68.
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Federal Court for similar relief from the S.D. Myers award. 59
Second, in July 2001, the trade ministers of Canada, Mexico, and the
United States adopted certain Notes of Interpretation (Notes)
regarding the obligation under Article 1105(1) to treat NAFTA
investors "in accordance with international law, including fair and
equitable treatment. ' '60 Specifically, Section B of the Notes provides
that:
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum
standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors
of another Party.
2. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full
protection and security" do not require treatment in addition to
or beyond that which is required by the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another
provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international
agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of
Article 1105(1).61
Although the Notes might not bear that construction, the NAFTA
Parties have interpreted them to reduce Article 1105(1) to the
customary international law prohibition of egregious, outrageous, or
shocking governmental conduct. 62 In addition, the NAFTA Parties
59. See In re Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of NAFrA Between S.D. Myers, Inc.
and Gov't of Canada, Notice of Application (Feb. 8, 2001), available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.catna-nacsdmyers review-e.asp; In re Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of NAFI'A
Between S.D. Myers, Inc. & Govt of Canada, Applicant's Memorandum of Fact and Law,
paras. 135, 137, 196, 222, 224 (Can. Fed. Ct. 2001), available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.catna-nad/sdmyers review-e.asp [hereinafter S.D. Myers, Canada's Memorandum
of Fact and Law]; In re Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA Between S.D. Myers, Inc.
and Gov't of Canada, Intervenor's Memorandum of Fact and Law (Dec. 13, 2001), paras. 4,
19, 26-29, 47-55, 60-61, 101-06, 133-42, (Can. Fed. Ct. 2001), available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/sdmyers review-e.asp [hereinafter S.D. Myers, Mexico's Memorandum
of Fact and Law].
60. Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, July 31, 2001, §
B, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-e.asp.
61. Id.
62. See Charles H. Brower, II, Fair and Equitable Treatment Under NAFTA's
Investment Chapter, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 9, 10 (2002). See also Pope & Talbot,
Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 51, paras. 52-65; ADF Group, Inc. v. United
States, Post-Hearing Submission of Respondent United States on Article 1105(1) and
Pope & Talbot (June 27, 2002), at 2-4, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
11662.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Post-Hearing Submission (ADF)]; ADF Group, Inc. v.
United States, Rejoinder of Respondent United States (Mar. 29, 2002), at 34, at
http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization9359.pdf; Loewen Group, Inc. v. United
States, Response of United States to the November 9, 2001 Submissions of the
Governments of Canada and Mexico Pursuant to NAFTA Article 1128 (Dec. 7, 2001), at
9, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6926.pdf [hereinafter Loewen Group,
U.S. Response to Article 1128 Submissions]; Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States,
Second Article 1128 Submission of United Mexican States (Nov. 9, 2001), at 5, at
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assert and, as of this writing in July 2002, one tribunal has agreed
that the Notes govern the outcome of claims that antedate July 2001,
even in cases where tribunals have already rendered partial-final
awards on liability.63
Emerging from the ebb and flow of claims, awards, annulment
proceedings, and notes of interpretation, one increasingly finds
allegations regarding the legitimacy of various steps taken by those
involved in the Chapter 11 process. 64 Joined by civil society and a
number of scholars, the NAFTA Parties accuse claimants of
advancing illegitimate claims 65 and describe the illegitimate nature
of tribunals and their decisions. 66 Joined by other scholars and,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6362.pdf [hereinafter Loewen Group,
Mexico's Second Article 1128 Submission].
63. See Pope & Talbot, Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 31, paras. 49,
51; U.S. Post-Hearing Submission (ADF), supra note 62, at 9-10, 9-10 n.22; United
Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Second Submission of the United States (May 13,
2002), para. 11, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/l0235.pdf; Methanex
Corp. v. United States, Article 1128 Submission of United Mexican States (Feb. 11,
2002), at 2-3, 7, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization8070.pdf; Methanex
Corp. v. United States, Third Submission of Canada Pursuant to NAFTA Article 1128
(Feb. 8, 2002), paras. 5, 8, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/8060.pdf
[hereinafter Methanex, Canada's Third Article 1128 Submission]; Loewen Group, U.S.
Response to Article 1128 Submissions, supra note 62, at 2; Loewen Group, Inc. v.
United States, Submission of the Government of Canada Pursuant to NAFTA Article
1128 (Nov. 19, 2001), paras. 15, 21, at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/6327.doc; Loewen Group, Mexico's Second Article 1128 Submission, supra
note 62, at 1; ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, Counter-Memorial of Respondent
United States on Competence and Liability (Nov. 29, 2001), at 48-49, 50, at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/7919.pdf; Methanex Corp. v. United
States, Response of Respondent United States to Methanex's Submission Concerning
the NAFTA Free Trade Commission's July 31, 2001 Interpretation (Oct. 26, 2001), at 2-
3, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization6028.pdf; Loewen Group, Inc. v.
United States, Rejoinder of the United States (Aug. 27, 2001), at 111-12, 144, 146-47,
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/7388.pdf. See also Thomas, supra note
2, at 455.
64. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, The Political Economy of NAFTA Chapter
Eleven: Equality Before the Law and the Boundaries of North American Integration, 23
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 308 (2000) (mentioning the "potential . . .
legitimacy problem" of Chapter 11); Afilalo, supra note 2, at 52 (asserting that Chapter
11 "suffers from a crisis of legitimacy"); Clarkson, supra note 2, at 369 (referring to the
"low legitimacy" of Chapter 11).
65. See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Counter-Memorial of the United
States (Mar. 30, 2001), at 3, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/7387.pdf
(accusing the claimant of transforming Chapter 11 into a "no-fault insurance policy);
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Statement of Defense of Respondent United States of
America (Aug. 10, 2000), para. 2, available at http://www.methanex.com/investorcentre/
mtbe ('Methanex's claims do not remotely resemble the type of grievance that the NAFTA
Parties consented to submit to arbitration.). See also MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's
CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 5, 13; Dhooge, supra note 48, at 213; Mann, supra note 47, at
405; Tollefson, supra note 24, at 184; Ferguson, supra note 40, at 503; Ganguly, supra note
17, at 153; Lalonde, supra note 2; Runnails & Mann, supra note 47; Stokes, supra note 48.
While many of the accusations are directed against perceived attempts to prevent
governments from discharging core regulatory functions, others suggest that investors
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arguably, two tribunals, claimants respond that requests for, and
performance of, heightened judicial review of awards represents an
illegitimate encroachment onto the jurisdiction of Chapter 11
tribunals, 67 and that the Notes constitute an ultra vires amendment
of NAFTA. 68  Because they appear to rest on strongly held
have brought claims not falling within the definition of "investment disputes." For
example, in three cases, Canada argued (unsuccessfully) that the claims actually
involved disputes about trade in goods or services, which fall within the state-to-state
remedial process of Chapter 20. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 40, paras.
236, 294-95, 297; Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award in Relation to the Preliminary
Motion by the Government of Canada (Jan. 26, 2000), paras. 19(3), 27-34, at
http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm [hereinafter Pope & Talbot, Award in
Relation to the Preliminary Motion by the Government of Canada]; Ethyl Corp. v.
Canada, Award on Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998), para. 62-64, 38 J.L.M. 708, 725 (1999)
[hereinafter Ethyl Corp., Award on Jurisdiction].
66. See S.D. Myers, Canada's Memorandum of Fact and Law, supra note 59,
paras. 135, 137, 196; S.D. Myers, Mexico's Memorandum of Fact and Law, supra note
59, paras. 4, 19, 26-29, 47-55, 60-61, 101-06, 133-42; Mexico's Outline of Argument
(Metalclad), supra note 23, paras. 46, 48, 59, 96, 227-28, 242, 248, 250, 262-63, 266-73,
310-11; Canada's Outline of Argument (Metalclad), supra note 58, paras. 25-32, 65, 69,
72-74, 77. See also Afilalo, supra note 2, at 51-52; Dhooge, supra note 48, at 279;
Fulvio Fracassi, Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L.
213, 221 (2001); Tollefson, supra note 17, at 163; Beauvais, supra note 2, at 246-47,
262; Lalonde, supra note 2; Mann & von Moltke, manuscript, supra note 3, at 19.
67. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Ruling Concerning Investor's Motion to
Change Place of Arbitration (Mar. 14, 2002), paras. 3-8, 17-20, at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.catna-nacruling-investor-motion.pdf [hereinafter Pope & Talbot, Ruling
Concerning Investor's Motion to Change Place of Arbitration]; United Parcel Serv. of Am. v.
Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on the Place of Arbitration (Oct. 17, 2001), paras. 8-9, 11,
available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/PA oct.pdf [hereinafter United Parcel,
Decision of Tribunal on the Place of Arbitration]; In re Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of
NAF'A Between S.D. Myers, Inc. and Govt of Canada, Respondent's Memorandum of Fact
and Law (Dec. 13, 2001), paras. 42, 44, 50-51, (Can. Fed. Ct. 2001) (on file with author); In re
Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA Between S.D. Myers, Inc. and Govt of Canada,
Respondent's Reply to Intervenor's Memorandum (Feb. 12, 2002), paras. 10-25, (Can. Fed.
Ct. 2001) (on file with author). See also Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 2, at
476-87; Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2, at 66-68, 81-88; William S. Dodge,
International Decision, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 910, 916 (2001).
Likewise, another tribunal mildly criticized Canada's baseless application to
"suspend the arbitration" pending judicial review of its partial-final award. See S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Procedural Order No. 18 (Feb. 26, 2001), paras. 8-11, 14-17
(NAFTAIUNCITRAL), at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm.
68. See Pope & Talbot, Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 51, paras. 17-
24, 43-47, 47 n.37; ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, Post-Hearing Submission of
Claimant on NAFTA Article 1105(1) and the Damages Award in Pope & Talbot and
Canada (July 11, 2002), para. 49, at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter
Claimant's Post Hearing Submission (ADF)]; ADF Group, Inc. v. United States,
Investor's Reply to Countermemorial of United States on Competence and Liability
(Jan. 28, 2002), paras. 213-20, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
7920.pdf; Methanex Corp. v. United States, Letter from Claimant to Tribunal (Sept. 18,
2001), at 1-3, 17-20, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization
6057.pdf [hereinafter Methanex, Claimant's Letter Brief]; Methanex Corp. v. United
States, Second Opinion of Professor Sir Robert Jennings, Q.C. (Sept. 6, 2001), at 4-5, at
http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter Methanex, Second Opinion of Professor Sir
Robert Jennings]. See also Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 2, at 476-87;
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convictions, these reciprocal allegations threaten the viability of
Chapter 11 and bode ill for its suitability as a model for the FTAA's
investment chapter. As noted above, similar controversies already
scuttled the draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment. 69  To
improve the future prospects for multilateral investment regimes, the
remainder of this Article abandons the cycle of recrimination and
seeks instead to initiate a productive discourse about the elements of
legitimacy and their presence or absence at critical junctures of the
Chapter 11 process.
III. ELEMENTS OF LEGITIMACY
The most highly qualified writers agree that international legal
regimes depend for their survival on perceptions of legitimacy, 70
which pull states and other participants toward voluntary compliance
with rules, as well as the decisions that interpret rules. 7 1 To generate
perceptions of legitimacy, legal regimes must operate predictably,
conform to historical practice, and incorporate fundamental values
shared by the governed community. For reasons stated below, the
widespread absence of such characteristics may push international
legal regimes to the brink of rejection and failure.72
Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2, at 56-57 n.71; Weiler, supra note 3, at 429;
Mann & von Moltke, manuscript, supra note 3, at 13-14.
69. See supra note 3.
70. See David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the
Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552, 554, 566-67 (1993); Jonathan I. Charney, Third
Party Dispute Settlement and International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 65, 66, 84
(1997); Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional
System, 240 RECUEIL DES COURS (HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT'L L.) 9, 26, 41 (1993 III)
[hereinafter Franck, Fairness]; Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International
System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705-06 (1988) [hereinafter Franck, Legitimacy]. See also
Obiora Chinedu Okafor, The Global Process of Legitimation and the Legitimacy of
Global Governance, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 117, 127 (1997); Alan Hyde, The
Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379, 401.
71. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 16,
49 (1990); Franck, Fairness, supra note 70, at 41. See also Tom J. Farer, Beyond the
Charter Frame: Unilateralism or Condominium?, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 361 (2002) ("A
process of decision making constitutes a normative system only when those affected
believe that in general they have an obligation to obey its results; in other words,
compliance with outputs of the process results at least in part from perceptions that it
is legitimate."); Hyde, supra note 70, at 380-81 ("In the sense in which it is most often
encountered, the 'legitimacy' of a social order is the effective belief in its binding or
obligatory quality.").
72. Because virtually no regime enjoys universal support, isolated perceptions
of illegitimacy are normal and pose no threat to the survival of a regime. See Caron,
supra note 70, at 558-59. True crises develop only when extremely influential actors or
large groups of actors come to perceive a regime as illegitimate. See id.
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A. Predictability
If one defines legitimacy in terms of qualities that pull the
subjects of regulation toward voluntary compliance, international
legal regimes that make arbitrary demands necessarily lack
legitimacy because they transform compliance into a random,
haphazard event. By contrast, international legal regimes that
operate predictably seem more likely to possess legitimacy because
they give subjects a meaningful opportunity to understand, and
conform their behavior to, systemic requirements. 73  Because
predictability thus supplies the necessary foundation for legitimacy,
one must identify the circumstances that enable the predictable
operation of legal regimes. 7
4
Borrowing from Professor Thomas Franck's vocabulary, one may
describe "determinacy" and "coherence" as the foundation of
predictable legal regimes. 75 "Determinacy" refers to the ability of
legal regimes to transmit clear signals about required standards of
conduct. 76 Such clarity encourages predictable behavior both by
providing states with a roadmap and by limiting their capacity to
avoid compliance through elastic interpretations. 77 "Coherence," by
contrast, means the potential to transmit consistent signals about
required standards of conduct. 78 To the extent that international
legal regimes send conflicting messages, they earn the reputation of
arbitrary, unpredictable, and, thus, illegitimate systems. 79
73. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 52; Franck, Fairness, supra note 70, at 50;
Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 70, at 713. See also Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting
Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes in International Trade
Organizations, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 697, 710 (1999) (explaining that "predictability of a
dispute resolution regime is very important to its users because it creates confidence in
the system"); Byrne, supra note 49, at 420 (reiterating that "less certainty means a loss
of the pact's legitimacy").
74. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 234 (referring to the "secular political
community's preference for, and dependence on, order and predictability").
75. See id. at 52 (identifying "determinacy" and "coherence" as two of the four
indicators of rule legitimacy).
76. Id. at 52; Franck, Fairness, supra note 70, at 48; Franck, Legitimacy, supra
note 70, at 713.
77. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 52-54, 57; Franck, Fairness, supra note 70,
at 48-50; Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 70, at 713-14, 716.
78. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 142, 174; Franck, Fairness, supra note 70, at
54-55; Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 70, at 738, 741, 750.
79. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 60 (explaining that "a high degree of textual
determinacy goes together with a high degree of rule-conforming state behavior"), 142
(stating that "coherence is essential to legitimacy"); Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 70,
at 716 (observing that the "degree of determinacy of a rule directly affects the degree of
its perceived legitimacy"), 741 (describing coherence as "a key factor in explaining why
rules compel"). See also Charney, supra note 70, at 66, 77, 81, 84-86, 89 (warning that
substantial variations in the application of rules may undermine the coherence and
legitimacy of international law); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary
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To some extent, international legal regimes may achieve
predictable operation through the adoption of determinate and
coherent treaty texts.80 Nevertheless, substantive disagreements, 8 1
bounded rationality, and the complexity of international relations
inevitably require the inclusion of certain vague, flexible, and
conflicting provisions whose application and reconciliation may
depend on the facts of individual cases. Although such provisions
reduce textual determinacy and coherence, legal regimes can still
maintain predictability by developing interpretive processes that
yield determinate and coherent results.8 2
B. Historical Practice and Shared Values
If predictable operation supplies the necessary foundation for the
legitimacy of international legal regimes, conformity to historical
practice and incorporation of shared values provide the load-bearing
walls. 83 As explained below, these elements enhance the legitimacy
of textual rules and interpretive processes by reinforcing their
International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449, 451 (2000) (arguing that customary
international law has become "a matter of taste" and, therefore, "cannot function as a
legitimate source of substantive legal norms"); Okafor, supra note 70, at 133 (stating
that if institutions apply the same rule inconsistently to multiple, similar situations,
"the decisions will seem selective" and illegitimate); Paul B. Stephan, Redistributive
Litigation: Judicial Innovation, Private Expectations and the Shadow of International
Law, 88 VA. L. REv. 789, 797 (2002) (arguing that courts with a history of disregarding
precedent will suffer a diminished capacity to shape future behavior).
80. See Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 70, at 713 (describing textual
determinacy as "the most self-evident of all characteristics making for legitimacy").
See also FRANCK, supra note 71, at 52, 60, 66; Franck, Fairness, supra note 70, at 48.
81. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 52 (observing that clarity may "reflect the
degree of agreement among a rule's authors").
82. See id. at 61, 66 (explaining that rules "with low textual determinacy may
overcome that deficit" if they remain subject to clarification by a process "recognized as
legitimate by those to whom the rule is addressed"); Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 70,
at 724 (proposing to reduce the costs of indeterminacy by relying on "process
determinacy" to introduce a forum that will resolve ambiguity "case by case"). See also
Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 70, at 750 (indicating that rules may achieve coherence
"when they are applied so as to preclude capricious checkerboarding") (emphasis
added).
83. See Jos E. Alvarez, The Quest for Legitimacy: An Examination of "The
Power of Nations" by Thomas M. Franck, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 199, 244 (1991)
(identifying the "widely accepted notion that legal institutions and laws project values
and that these values are accepted because they converge with those of the actors,
which in turn serves to legitimate them"); Hyde, supra note 70, at 403, 412-13
(observing that, under the model of substantive legitimation, rules derive their impact
from correspondence to rules already held by the population); Kelly, supra note 79, at
456 (stating that the "community's acceptance of norms ... confers legitimacy on
them"). See also Mark Killian Brewer, The European Union and Legitimacy: Time for
a European Constitution, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 555, 578 (2001) (identifying "tradition"
as a basis of legitimacy).
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predictability,8 4 and by weaving them into the temporal and
ideological structure of the regulated communities.8 5
Borrowing, again, from Professor Franck's vocabulary, one may
describe conformity with historical practice in terms of "pedigree" and
"ritual.' '8 6 While both concepts provide a sense of continuity, the
former does so more explicitly than the latter. Thus, pedigrees
represent symbolic devices that establish obvious connections
between historical models and existing regimes,8 7 thereby increasing
the legitimacy of the latter in two ways. First, because pedigrees
require adherence to historical models, they increase the tendency of
existing regimes to follow established-that is, predictable-
patterns.8 8 Second, because pedigrees function like trademarks, they
can signal that a regime's format has already achieved a reputation
for quality and a tradition of voluntary compliance, both of which may
support a presumption of future compliance.
"Rituals" involve ceremonies that have evolved over time and
that also promote legitimacy in two ways.8 9 First, to the extent that
they contemplate the repetition of familiar behaviors, rituals
reinforce the predictable operation of legal regimes. 90 Second, in
most legal regimes, rituals provide unstated reasons for compliance
with textual rules or the product of interpretive processes. 91 For
example, in the United States, judges wear black robes to emphasize
84. Thus, to a certain extent, conformity to historical practice and shared
values represents an amplification of the modern, secular community's quest for order
and predictability. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
85. See Alvarez, supra note 83, at 252 (stating that "international actors are
driven to prior institutions and norms evincing legitimacy which in turn reinforce the
legitimacy cycle").
86. In other words, "ritual" and "pedigree" supply legitimacy's "cultural and
anthropological dimension." FRANCK, supra note 71, at 91; Franck, Legitimacy, supra
note 70, at 725.
87. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 94 (explaining that pedigrees "pull[ ] toward
rule compliance by emphasizing the deep rootedness of. . . rule[s] or the rule-making"
institutions and by "emphasizing . . . venerable historic . . . social origins and
continuity"); Franck, Fairness, supra note 70, at 53 (observing that the "law extends a
particular veneration to rules that have withstood the test of time"); Franck,
Legitimacy, supra note 70, at 726-27 (noting that "[t]he compliance pull of a rule is
enhanced by a demonstrable lineage").
88. See Alvarez, supra note 83, at 237 (concluding that Professor Franck's
theory of legitimacy "favor[s] those rules on which states agree at the present time").
Cf. Stephan, supra note 79, at 801 (suggesting that the regular observance of property
and contract law serves the purpose of "honoring widely held expectations" and that
the absence of such traditional, predictable rules would make life "incoherent and
morally arbitrary").
89. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 92 (defining "rituals" as a "specialized form
of symbolic validation marked by ceremonies"). See also Kelly, supra note 79, at 497
(noting that rituals "confer authority").
90. In other words, rituals use symbols to communicate and perpetuate the
beliefs and values of legal regimes. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 93.
91. See id. at 92.
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both the power of the state and the respect that an independent,
professional judiciary has earned over the course of two centuries. 92
Likewise, in international arbitration, the selection of party-
appointed arbitrators increases the likelihood of compliance by
providing an opportunity to recruit decisionmakers who possess
relevant expertise and enjoy the confidence of the parties. Finally, in
adjudication of all sorts, oral hearings increase the likelihood of
compliance by guaranteeing that the decisionmakers have, in fact,
received and considered the parties' submissions.
In order for pedigrees and rituals to promote legitimacy,
however, the members of the governed community must believe that
current practices do, in fact, conform to historical models. 93 For
example, if the current Iraqi regime were to adopt the text of the U.S.
Constitution verbatim, the pedigree would fail because current Iraqi
practice manifestly departs from the historical model. Likewise,
rituals cannot enhance legitimacy when the officiants deviate
significantly from tradition 94 or perform rituals to promote self-
interest.95 For example, U.S. judges who take the bench without
their robes may fail to command respect, just as their robes would
elicit expressions of scorn or amusement if worn to the beach.
Likewise, the decisions of judges in their own divorce proceedings
would command no respect. 96 Thus, when designing new legal
regimes, one must beware of the temptation to adopt pedigrees and
rituals formed under different circumstances, and one must ensure
that important decision-making rituals avoid perceptions of self-
interest. If significant gaps appear between models and reality, the
92. See Hyde, supra note 70, at 405 ("The population was induced to follow its
leaders partly because of the form of legal decisions-the accompanying ritual and
majesty.").
93. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 117, 120, 127-28, 134. See also Martti
Koskenniemi, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 175, 176
(1992) (noting that "if symbols clash with what is perceived as... true, they undermine
themselves").
94. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 134; Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 70, at
735-36, 738.
95. See Caron, supra note 70, at 561 (observing that legitimacy requires
procedural integrity, which requires that officials be independent of the governed and
"have no interest in a particular outcome"). See also Schneider, supra note 73, at 737-
38 (indicating that international organizations derive their legitimacy, in part, from
their perceived "neutrality" and "independence" in resolving disputes). Thus,
decisionmakers who wish to achieve legitimacy must act in a "disinterested, principled
fashion" and must avoid the perception of gratifying self-interest. FRANCK, supra note
71, at 64; Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 70, at 725.
96. Cf. In re W. Stephen Thayer, III: Report of the Attorney General 12-21 (Mar.
31, 2000), at www.state.nh.us/nhdojlPress%20Release/reportonthayer.pdf (discussing a
state supreme court justice's attempt to influence the appointment of a judge in his
own divorce proceedings and his subsequent resignation in the face of a criminal
investigation).
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symbols will lose their "magic" and the regimes may be accused of
making false pretensions to legitimacy.9 7
Like strict conformance to historical practice, the incorporation
of shared values enhances legitimacy in two ways. 98 First, the
incorporation of such values increases the likelihood that institutions
will formulate, interpret, and apply rules in predictable ways. 99
Second, the incorporation of shared values promotes voluntary
compliance by establishing a sense of harmony between legal regimes
and the ideologies of governed communities.'0 0 For example, the
international community increasingly values the principles of
accountability, 10 1 transparency,10 2 and democratic participation.10 3
97. FRANCK, supra note 71, at 127-28, 134.
98. Professor Franck uses the term "adherence" to describe this concept. See
Franck, Fairness, supra note 70, at 57.
99. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 184 (explaining that "a rule is more likely to
obligate if it is made within the framework of an organized normative hierarchy[ ] than
if it is merely an ad hoc agreement between parties in a state of nature").
100. See Franck, Fairness, supra note 70, at 57 (observing that "rules are better
able to pull towards compliance if . . . they are supported by the procedural and
institutional framework within which the community organizes itself').
101. See, e.g., Caron, supra note 70, at 561 (suggesting that accountability
promotes integrity, which in turn supports legitimacy); Paul B. Stephan, Accountability
and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
681, 682 (1996-1997) (indicating that free and democratic societies "regard
accountability as fundamental"); Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law-
Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1562, 1578 (1999) (stating that "the international process suffers
from an accountability deficit," which "affects the content of rules and puts their
legitimacy into question"); Beauvais, supra note 2, at 262-63 (describing
"accountability" as one of the traits upon which judicial legitimacy rests).
Accountability also supports legitimacy by increasing the likelihood that
decisionmakers will follow prescribed rituals and render coherent decisions.
102. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade
Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 547, 574, 603 (2000) (stating that transparency
both restrains the power of interest groups and levels the playing field, and calling on
the WTO to adopt the "attributes of transparency associated with proper
adjudication"); Schneider, supra note 73, at 703 (concluding that transparency "has
become an important factor in assessing the legitimacy of international organizations").
Transparency also supports legitimacy by increasing determinacy and allowing
participants to monitor compliance with rituals. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra, at
574 (explaining that transparency requires the publication of regulations and, thereby,
clarifies the steps required for compliance); Schneider, supra note 73, at 710 (indicating
that transparency increases the predictability of systems for dispute resolution).
103. See, e.g., Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
451, 455, 457 (2001) (complaining that "[tihe WTO receives no democratic input" and
"places a large sphere of economic activity beyond the reach of ordinary politics");
Caron, supra note 70, at 561 (indicating that the "opportunity for representative
participation" promotes integrity, which in turn supports legitimacy); Kelly, supra note
79, at 453, 517, 523 (arguing, in part, that the formulation of customary international
law "lacks procedural legitimacy" because it "violates the basic notion of democratic
governance among states and is a particularly ineffective way to generate substantive
norms that will commend compliance"); Brewer, supra note 83, at 578-79 (quoting K.C.
WHEARE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONs 54-55 (2d ed. 1966), for the proposition that
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Therefore, the use of accountable and transparent institutions to
formulate and interpret rules should increase voluntary compliance
with-and, thus, the legitimacy of-international legal regimes.
Similarly, the creation of opportunities for democratic participation
should increase voluntary compliance and legitimacy, while the
maintenance of unjustified power imbalances should have the
opposite effect.10 4 Although the failure to incorporate such values
may not immediately incapacitate legal regimes, the resulting
legitimacy deficits can encourage governed communities to divert
important issues to alternative regimes. 10 5
To recapitulate, the legitimacy of international legal regimes
depends on predictable operation, conformity to historical practice,
and the incorporation of fundamental values shared by members of
the governed community. 10 6 Determinacy and coherence lay the
necessary foundation by establishing the existence of a predictable
system.' 0 7 Conformance to historical practice and the incorporation
of shared values reinforce legitimacy by weaving that system into the
"[c]onstitutions generally validate themselves as basing their legitimacy upon 'the
people' of a particular state").
104. Professor Caron identifies power imbalances as a source of the perceived
illegitimacy of the U.N. Security Council. See Caron, supra note 70, at 562-63; David
D. Caron, Strengthening the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 303, 305-06 (1993).
105. For example, the U.N. Security Council and the International Criminal
Court (ICC) both have the competence to address certain forms of widespread violence
that present a threat to international peace and security. The United States and other
permanent members supported proposals for robust Security Council control over the
ICC. See Lara A. Ballard, The Recognition and Enforcement of International Criminal
Court Judgments in U.S. Courts, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143, 154-55 (1997);
Christopher Keith Hall, Current Development: The First Two Sessions of the UN
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 91
AM. J. INT'L L. 177, 181, 182 (1997); Jelena Pejic, The United States and the
International Criminal Court: One Loophole Too Many, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 267,
283-84 (2001); David J. Scheffer, Developments in International Criminal Law: The
United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12, 13 (1999).
Many other states balked at such proposals. See Hall, supra, at 181, 182; Pejic, supra,
at 283-84; Scheffer, supra, at 14. This may reflect a principled opposition to political
interference with judicial processes. See Hall, supra, at 181; Pejic, supra, at 283-84.
Perhaps it also reflects dissatisfaction with the Security Council's structure and
operation and, therefore, represents an attempt to divert certain issues to an
alternative forum. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Politics by Other Means: The Law of the
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 489, 496 (1999) (describing India's
opposition to Security Council control over the ICC as a revolt against the Security
Council's unbalanced structure and a "claim about the proper allocation of political
authority at the dawn of a new century"); Paul C. Szasz, The United States Should Join
the International Criminal Court, 9 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 1, 3 (1998/1999) (indicating
that many states did not consider the Security Council "sufficiently representative" to
control the work of the ICC).
106. See supra notes 73-105 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
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traditions and ideology of the governed community.10 8 While legal
regimes cannot achieve legitimacy without predictable operation,
they may do so in the absence of either conformity to historical
practice or incorporation of fundamental values. For example, new
institutions may achieve legitimacy by incorporating the increasingly
shared values of accountability, transparency, and democratic
participation.10 9 Conversely, established regimes may, for a time, use
their pedigrees to maintain legitimacy despite their failure to
incorporate increasingly shared values of the international
community. 110  While one may not, therefore, describe either
conformity to historical practice or incorporation of fundamental
values as a necessary condition of legitimacy, one still might
characterize them as necessary alternatives. If a legal regime lacks a
meaningful connection to both the traditions and the ideology of the
governed community, its predictable operation may not be sufficient
to generate widespread perceptions of legitimacy."'
IV. LEGITIMACY AND THE STRUCTURE OF NAFTA's INVESTMENT
CHAPTER
Because claimants, the NAFTA Parties, and arbitral tribunals
have all become targets of sincere and sustained criticism, one must
explore the possibility that NAFTA's investment chapter
108. See supra notes 83-105 and accompanying text.
109. See Alvarez, supra note 83, at 238 n.185 (recognizing that some observers
view the absence of pedigrees or rituals as "not necessarily determinative" of legitimacy
or illegitimacy). For example, while the increasing participation of civil society in the
formation of international law contradicts many traditional tenets, the process seems
to have accumulated a high degree of legitimacy due to the perceived benefits for
transparency, accountability, and democratic values. See Tollefson, supra note 17, at
142-43 (describing the transformation of non-state actors into "increasingly formidable
players" that are "beginning to reshape the norms and procedures of international
relations" and "forcing the rules in [that] arena to change").
110. For example, people frequently criticize the U.N. Security Council and the
European Union for their lack of democratic legitimacy. See, e.g., Caron, supra note 70,
at 562-66 (discussing criticisms of the Security Council); Patrick Fitzmaurice, Attorney
General v. X: A Lost Opportunity to Examine the Limits of European Integration, 27
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1723, 1734-35 (2001) (describing the EU's "democracy deficit"). Yet,
due in no small part to their pedigrees, those two institutions operate tolerably well
and are certain to do so for the foreseeable future.
111. See Koskenniemi, supra note 93, at 176 ("Mere clarity may not suffice to
create legitimacy .. "). For example, an authoritarian regime based on fear could not
retain legitimacy over time even if it incorporated determinate and coherent rules. See
Farer, supra note 71, at 361 ("If fear alone secured compliance, I would not call the
decision-making process normative, although it might possibly be effective for a time.").
Perhaps for this reason, the Soviet regime tried to use both the prospective
development of ideology and the retrospective pedigree of Russian nationalism to boost
its legitimacy. The regime ultimately failed due, in part, to the ideology's failure to
take root and the governed community's rejection of Russian nationalism as a true
pedigree for communism.
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affirmatively encourages each group to perform acts of questionable
legitimacy at various stages of the arbitral process. To this end, Part
IV examines the junctures at which each group seems most
vulnerable to allegations of illegitimate conduct. While recognizing
that Chapter l's drafters apparently took measures to overcome
legitimacy problems, it suggests that the remedies frequently prove
more troublesome than the disease. For example, to resolve problems
of textual indeterminacy, Chapter 11 supplies an arbitral process that
generates incoherent rulings on a key provision, lacks an accepted
pedigree, arguably seems prone to deviations from ritual, and
evidently fails to incorporate the fundamental values of the governed
community.1 1 2  Similarly, to ensure that tribunals comply with
rituals, to increase the coherence of their decisions, and to promote
accountability, Chapter 11 establishes two control mechanisms that
seem equally, if not more, incapable of resolving incoherence,
predisposed to disregard ritual for reasons of self-interest, and
isolated from the governed community's fundamental values.11 3
Further complicating matters, Chapter 11 introduces a sort of
constitutional indeterminacy by establishing no clear division of labor
between tribunals, municipal courts, and the Free Trade
Commission.11 4  Thus, despite its seemingly classic architecture,
Chapter 11 seems destined to invite conduct of questionable
legitimacy and, possibly, its own demise.
A. Legitimacy and Claimants: Villains or Scapegoats for Textual
Indeterminacy?
Popular accounts depict claimants as villains who have pushed
Chapter 11 beyond its intended scope, transforming a defensive tool
into an offensive weapon 1 5 that threatens the capacity of
governments to regulate in the public interest.1 1 6 Although certain
claims may strain the bounds of legitimacy, the problem lies not in
the perverse appetites of investors but in the treaty's indeterminate
text.
Observers commonly refer to the "broad," "vague," or "uncertain"
provisions of Chapter 11,117 which leave abundant room for
112. See infra notes 142-202 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 203-43 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 244-67 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
116. See PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 1; Banks, supra
note 50, at 499; Clarkson, supra note 2, at 377, 379; Dhooge, supra note 48, at 213, 276-
77; Nogales, supra note 48, at 131-32; Soloway & Broadhurst, supra note 2, at 389;
Tollefson, supra note 24, at 185; Beauvais, supra note 2, at 263-64; Ganguly, supra
note 17, at 114; Lalonde, supra note 2.
117. See, e.g., MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA'S CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 6, 8,
15, 18-19, 44, 60; PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 9, 23; Afilalo,
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interpretive debate about the jurisdiction of tribunals, the scope of
the chapter's coverage, and the type of conduct prohibited or required
by substantive disciplines. For example, while the treaty describes
the execution of written consents and waivers as "conditions
precedent" to submission of a claim to arbitration, 11 8 it does not
specify whether execution represents a condition precedent to the
tribunal's jurisdiction'1 9 or merely to admissibility of the claim. 120
Likewise, while Chapter 1l's scope extends to measures "relating to"
investors and investments, 12 1 it does not specify whether tribunals
should construe that term broadly to mean "affecting" investors and
investments 122 or narrowly to mean "primarily aimed at" investors
and investments. 1 23  In addition, while Chapter 11 regulates
measures "tantamount to expropriation,"'1 24 it does not specify
whether that term reflects the concept of "creeping expropriation" as
defined by customary international law, or establishes a more
demanding lex specialis for the North American region.125
Furthermore, while Chapter 11 requires national treatment for
investors and investments "in like circumstances,"'126 it does not
specify whether tribunals should use market sector, production
supra note 2, at 4; Banks, supra note 50, at 508, 509; Cremades & Cairns, supra note 3,
at 194, 195; Dhooge, supra note 48, at 281, 284; Gantz, supra note 40, at 658, 675-76;
Gantz, supra note 3, at 341; Herman, supra note 40, at 134; Richard C. Levin & Susan
Erickson Marin, NAFTA Chapter 11: Investment and Investment Disputes, 2 NAFTA L.
& Bus. REV. AM. 82, 85 (1996); Scott Philip Little, Canada's Capacity to Control the
Flow: Water Export and the North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 PACE INT'L L.
REV. 127, 145, 158 (1996); Mann, supra note 47, at 403; Daniel M. Price, Chapter 11-
Private Party vs. Government, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or
Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 107, 109 (2000); Price, Overview of the NAFTA
Investment Chapter, supra note 42, at 736; Gloria Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment
Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 323 (1994); Soloway, Challenge of Private Party Participation,
supra note 3, at 13; Tollefson, supra note 24, at 213-14; Beauvais, supra note 2, at 257;
Ganguly, supra note 17, at 121; Luke Eric Peterson, Investor Rights and Wrongs,
TORONTO STAR, June 14, 2002, at A22, available at 2002 WL 22720920.
118. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1121.
119. See Ethyl Corp., Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 65, para. 89 (recounting
Canada's argument).
120. See id. paras. 74-75 (recounting the investor's argument).
121. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1101.
122. Pope & Talbot, Award in Relation to the Preliminary Motion by the
Government of Canada, supra note 65, para. 29 (setting forth the investor's argument).
123. Id. paras. 27-28 (setting forth Canada's argument).
124. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(1).
125. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 43-44;
Price, supra note 117, at 111; Thomas, supra note 23, at 104. Several investors have
relied on the latter view in advancing claims for expropriation. See S.D. Myers, Partial
Award, supra note 40, para. 285; Metalclad, Award, supra note 54, para. 27; Pope &
Talbot, Interim Award, supra note 51, para. 84.
126. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1102(1), (2).
[VOL. 36.37
20031 STRUCTURE, LEGITIMACY AND NAFTA"S INVESTMENT CHAPTER 61
methods, or physical location as relevant points for comparison. 127
Similarly, while Chapter 11 requires host states to provide "fair and
equitable treatment" in accordance with international law, 128 it does
not identify the hallmarks of fairness and equity. Finally, while
Chapter 11 recognizes the authority of host states to perform public
health "functions"'129 and to adopt "measures" to protect the
environment, 130 it fails to specify how that authority relates to, or
possibly qualifies, the substantive obligations of host states.' 3' In
short, Chapter 11 in significant measure lacks textual
determinacy. 1
32
Faced with this degree of textual indeterminacy, Chapter 11
claimants have predictably, and quite rationally, interpreted
ambiguities to their greatest advantage. 133  Thus, they have at
various times contended that Chapter l1's procedural requirements
lack jurisdictional significance, 134 that Chapter 11 applies to all
measures that "affect" investments, 13 5 and that Chapter 11 creates
uniquely high levels of legal protection for cross-border investment.
13 6
Wrapped into a single package, these arguments suggest that
127. See, e.g., ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, Memorial of the Investor (Aug.
1, 2001), para. 130, available at http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/5964.pdf
[hereinafter Memorial of the Investor (ADF)] ("The phrase 'in like circumstances' is
open to a wide variety of interpretations both in the abstract and in the context of a
particular dispute."). See also MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA'S CHAPTER 11, supra note
3, at 29-30 (noting the lack of understanding about the relevant factors for defining
"like circumstances" in the context of long-term investments); PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC
PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 26 (identifying the lack of understanding about the
appropriate definition of "like circumstances" in the investment context); Paterson,
supra note 3, at 92-95 (discussing possible constructions of the phrase "in like
circumstances"); Mann & von Moltke, manuscript, supra note 3, at 9-10 (examining the
interpretative questions raised by Chapter 11's provisions on national treatment).
128. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105(1).
129. See id. art. 1101(4).
130. See id. art. 1114(1).
131. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
132. See Soloway, Challenge of Private Party Participation, supra note 3, at 3
(asserting that the "lack of clarity ... in Chapter 11 prevents the establishment of a
secure and stable framework for investments").
133. See Soloway & Broadhurst, supra note 2, at 404 ("There should be no
surprise that claimants continue to push the edges of the definition of expropriation in
order to obtain compensation."). See also MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA'S CHAPTER 11,
supra note 3, at 14 (observing that foreign investors "have no other interest to consider
than their own operations and profits"); Afilalo, supra note 2, at 4 (presuming that
claimants act in accordance with their economic interests). While some observers have
urged investors to exercise greater caution, that seems unrealistic. See Price, supra
note 117, at 114 (urging counsel to use caution in framing their claims and to refrain
from pushing Chapter 11 "too far").
134. See Ethyl Corp., Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 65, paras. 74-75.
135. Pope & Talbot, Award in Relation to the Preliminary Motion by the
Government of Canada, supra note 65, para. 29 (setting forth the investor's argument).
136. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 40, para. 285; Metalclad, Award,
supra note 54, para. 27; Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, supra note 51, para. 84.
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Chapter 11 provides unlimited access to an international forum for
attacking all democratically-adopted measures that interfere with the
performance of investments. 137 Taken to extremes, this view depicts
host states as helpless victims of mighty investors. 138 This apparent
inversion of reality139 and frustration of the democratic process 140
naturally generate concerns about the legitimacy of Chapter 11.
While aggressive and unsettling claims may represent an
obvious symptom of illegitimacy, they do not constitute its source.
The root of the problem lies not in the purportedly avaricious hearts
of investors but in textual indeterminacy created by the NAFTA
Parties. Yet one should not judge the legitimacy of Chapter 11 based
137. See Loewen Group, Notice of Claim, supra note 46, para. 164 (defining
expropriation to include all government action that "interferes with an alien's use or
enjoyment of property"). See also Jos6 E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North
American Free Trade Agreement's Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 303,
307 (1997) (asserting that NAFTA's investment chapter has given foreign investors
"direct access to binding denationalized adjudication of any governmental measure that
interferes with their ample rights"); Banks, supra note 50, at 504 (explaining that some
consider Chapter 11 to provide investors with "an indemnity against the risk of
economic loss due to at least some forms of regulation"); Clarkson, supra note 2, at 376
("NAFTA's major innovation in the service of corporate empowerment was to extend
investors' rights to include the capacity of a firm . . . to challenge a [host] government's
... legislation for virtually any measure that jeopardizes the company's profitability.");
Nogales, supra note 48, at 112 (suggesting that Chapter 11 imposes liability for all
measures that "reduce or limit the value of ... private commercial property");
Tollefson, supra note 17, at 148 (describing the perception of Chapter 11 "as a Bill of
Rights for transnational corporations" that creates a "right to sue host governments for
enacting bona fide, non-discriminatory public health and environmental regulations");
Ganguly, supra note 17, at 152 (describing Chapter 11 as a "tool for attacking any
legislation or regulation that [investors] do not find beneficial").
138. See Nogales, supra note 48, at 133 (suggesting that Chapter 11 enables
investors to "intimidate" lawmakers). Investment treaties create perceptions of
"helpless sovereignty" by providing investors with liberal access to a forum in which to
pursue claims, but providing host states with no corresponding right to seek
arbitration against investors. See Cremades & Cairns, supra note 3, at 189. See also
PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 19. But see Levin & Marin,
supra note 117, at 92 (suggesting that Chapter 11 does not expressly preclude counter-
claims). Tribunals may enhance such perceptions by penalizing host states for
attempts to retaliate against investors who invoke the machinery of investor-state
arbitration. Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, supra note 51, at paras.
156-81.
139. See Stephan, supra note 79, at 803-04 (discussing "reverse paternalism,"
which "depicts government as the victim based on theories of improper private
interference with the exercise of regulatory power" and "inverts a political order that
presumes government potency and private person vulnerability"). See also MANN &
VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 16 (suggesting that Chapter 11
might lead to the "entirely perverse result" of requiring governments to pay for the
privilege of regulating pollution); Dhooge, supra note 48, at 279 (asserting that Chapter
11 gives foreign investors an "undue advantage over host governments with respect to
issues of economic regulation").
140. See Clarkson, supra note 2, at 378 (stating that Chapter 11 gives
"corporations the power to overturn the legislative outcomes of national policy debates
on the desirable regime to secure the health and safety of the citizenry").
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solely on the presence of textual indeterminacy. As noted above,
textually indeterminate legal regimes may still achieve legitimacy by
creating interpretive processes to infuse ambiguous text with clear
meaning. Under these circumstances, the Author and others have
counseled readers to examine the jurisprudence of Chapter 11
tribunals before drawing ultimate conclusions about the legitimacy of
NAFTA's investment regime.1
4 1
B. Legitimacy and Tribunals: Remedy or Complication?
Turning to the decisions of Chapter 11 tribunals, one finds as of
this writing that most have discharged their task of enunciating
determinate rules, thus promoting the legitimacy of NAFTA's
investment chapter. 142 For example, tribunals have reached virtual
unanimity on the proposition that, in the absence of prejudice, non-
compliance with Chapter l's procedural "conditions precedent"
results in a curable obstacle to the admissibility of claims, as opposed
to a drastically preclusive defect in the jurisdiction of tribunals. 14 3
Likewise, as of this writing, every tribunal that has addressed the
question has concluded that Chapter 11 embraces all measures
"relating to" investors and investments, even if those measures are
"primarily directed at" trade in goods or services. 144 In the cases that
have raised the issue, tribunals also have decided that the phrase
"tantamount to expropriation" does not create a lex specialis for the
141. See Brower, supra note 10, at 45; Soloway & Broadhurst, supra note 2, at
390, 403; Beauvais, supra note 2, at 266; Loritz, supra note 47, at 549. See also Price,
supra note 117, at 113 ("These are sensible arbitrators. If the United States is right
and the investor is wrong, it is likely that the tribunal will so find."); Daniel M. Price,
Some Observations on Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 421,
424 (2000) ("There is no reason to expect.., that arbitration tribunals will be receptive
to attempts to turn [Chapter 11] into a weapon to attack bona fide regulatory
behavior.").
142. See Beauvais, supra note 2, at 278 ("Despite the small number of claims
decided on the merits, some emerging jurisprudential trends can be detected in the
decisions .. "). But see Dodge, supra note 67, at 918 (asserting that "Chapter 11
tribunals have reached different interpretations" on "numerous questions").
143. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award Concerning the Motion by
Government of Canada Respecting the Claim Based Upon Imposition of the "Super Fee"
(Aug. 7, 2000), para. 26, available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm; Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award in Relation to Preliminary Motion by Government of Canada
to Strike Paragraphs 34 and 103 of the Statement of the Claim from the Record (the
"Harmac Motion") (Feb. 24, 2000), paras. 12-13, 16, available at
http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm; Ethyl Corp., Award on Jurisdiction, supra note
65, paras. 90-91. But see Waste Mgmt., Award, supra note 52 (dismissing a claim for lack of
jurisdiction because the investor failed to satisfy the conditions precedent).
144. S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 40, paras. 294-95; id. paras. 61-62
(separate opinion of Bryan Schwartz); Pope & Talbot, Award in Relation to the
Preliminary Motion by the Government of Canada, supra note 65, paras. 33-34; Ethyl
Corp., Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 65, paras. 63-64. See also Afilalo, supra note
2, at 5, 8, 19-20; Brower, supra note 10, at 55-56.
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North American region but merely incorporates customary
international law on creeping expropriation. 145 Furthermore, while
Chapter 11 tribunals have not produced a complete definition of the
term "like circumstances" for purposes of national treatment, they
have given the NAFTA Parties considerable latitude to discriminate
among investors and investments based on rational policy
considerations. 14 6 Finally, while they may not have resolved all
questions about the relationship between investment disciplines and
public regulation, tribunals have found that NAFTA's environmental
provisions supply a key part of the interpretive context for Chapter
I,147 recognized the "high measure of deference that international
law generally extends to ... domestic authorities to regulate matters
within their ... borders,"'148 and agreed that regulations typically fall
short of the deprivation required to sustain claims for
expropriation.' 49 Thus, as predicted by some and confirmed by
others, most Chapter 11 tribunals have developed clear rules that
strike a healthy balance between the interests of foreign investors
with the regulatory obligations of host states. 150 In so doing, they
have used "process determinacy" to resolve the problem of textual
indeterminacy in NAFTA's investment chapter. 1 1
Despite their generally high level of success in promoting
determinacy, the NAFTA Parties, their courts, and many observers
seem to regard Chapter 11 tribunals as institutions of questionable
legitimacy. As explained below, one may attribute such views largely
145. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 40, paras. 285-86; Pope &
Talbot, Interim Award, supra note 51, para. 104. See also Brower, supra note 10, at
67-68; Beauvais, supra note 2, at 278, 285; Mann & von Moltke, manuscript, supra note
3, at 16.
146. See Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, supra note 51, paras.
78-79 (indicating that differences in treatment do not violate the principle of national
treatment if they have a "reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1) do
not distinguish, on their face or de facto, between foreign-owned and domestic
companies, and (2) do not otherwise unduly undermine the investment liberalizing
objectives of NAFTA"); S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 40, para. 250 (concluding
that the "assessment of 'like circumstances' must take into account circumstances that
would justify governmental regulations that treat [nationals and aliens] differently in
order to protect the public interest"). See also Brower, supra note 10, at 72-75; Gantz,
supra note 40, at 711; Mann & von Moltke, manuscript, supra note 3, at 11.
147. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 40, paras. 285-86. See also
Brower, supra note 10, at 74; Gantz, supra note 40, at 682; Tollefson, supra note 17, at
153 n.62; Weiler, supra note 17, at 182-83.
148. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 40, para. 263. See also Brower,
supra note 10, at 78-85.
149. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 40, paras. 281-82; Pope &
Talbot, Interim Award, supra note 51, para. 99; Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra
note 2, at 80-81; Brower, supra note 10, at 69-71.
150. See Brower, supra note 10, at 52, 66-85; Brower & Steven, supra note 40, at
201; Weiler, supra note 17, at 173-74, 188; Soloway & Broadhurst, supra note 2, at 403.
151. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 80 (drawing a distinction between "textual
determinacy" and "process determinacy").
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to the investment chapter's structure, which provides for ad hoc
tribunals based on the model of commercial arbitration and, thereby,
raises problems of coherence, pedigree, ritual, and adherence to the
fundamental values of the governed community.
To depoliticize investment disputes, 152 and to level the playing
field between foreign investors and host states, 153 Chapter 11
commits investment disputes to the process of international
commercial arbitration 154 under the Additional Facility Rules or the
UNCITRAL Rules. 15 5 These rules provide for the appointment of
three-member tribunals ad hoc, and the Author is reliably informed
that most arbitrators expect to receive only a single appointment to
serve in Chapter 11 disputes.156 In addition, the rules contemplate
greater confidentiality in proceedings 5 7 and less systematic reporting
of decisions than might be expected in litigation before municipal
tribunals. Finally, Article 1136 supplements the rules by providing
that the awards of tribunals "shall have no binding furce except
between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular
case."'158  While this structure may predominate in routine
commercial arbitration and may promote the interpretive flexibility of
Chapter 11 tribunals, 159 it generates notable concerns when applied
to a high volume of investor-state arbitration under a single
governing instrument between nations that have mature regulatory
systems and high volumes of cross-border investment.
152. See Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2, at 73; Brower & Steven,
supra note 40, at 195; Clarkson, supra note 2, at 377; Price, supra note 117, at 112. See
also William W. Park, Arbitration and the FISC: NAFTA's 'Tax Veto," 2 CHI. J. INT'L L.
231, 231 (2001) ("NAFTA gives foreign investors a right to settle investment disputes
by arbitration, a process more politically and procedurally neutral than either host
state courts or foreign gunboats.").
153. See Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2, at 73; Brower & Steven,
supra note 40, at 196. See also Avramovich, supra note 40, at 1254 (identifying the
maintenance of "judicial equality" as a "major task in the settlement of investment
disputes").
154. See Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 2, at 471-76; Brower,
Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2, at 69-74. See also Clarkson, supra note 2, at 377
(recognizing that Chapter 11 "has imported an ... arbitration mechanism designed to
handle international intercorporate disputes").
155. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. As noted above, Chapter 11
also contemplates arbitration under the ICSID Convention, but this option currently
does not exist because Canada and Mexico are not states parties to that convention.
See supra note 24.
156. It should be noted, however, that the Honorable Benjamin Civiletti has sat
in three arbitrations. The two completed arbitrations are: Metalclad, Award, supra
note 54, para. 70, and Azinian, Award, supra note 51. Civiletti also sits in the
resubmitted case of Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico. See ICSID, List of Pending Cases
(No. 17), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm.
157. See infra notes 191-202 and accompanying text.
158. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1136(1).
159. Brower, supra note 62, at 9.
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Although the awards of Chapter 11 tribunals have reached a
high level of coherence on many issues, 160 incongruity has become the
hallmark of decisions involving the minimum standard of treatment
set forth in Article 1105(1).161 As noted above, that provision requires
the NAFTA Parties to treat each others' investors "in accordance with
international law, including fair and equitable treatment."162  By
establishing a somewhat creative, rather than a purely analytical,
charge for ad hoc tribunals, 163 the last five words seem to invite-
perhaps even require-decisions that may raise concerns about
legitimacy. To begin with, creative lawmaking by unrepresentative
tribunals seems undemocratic and almost certain to yield
unpedigreed outcomes. 164 Perhaps more importantly, however, the
uncoordinated commitment of creative lawmaking to a series of ad
160. See supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
161. See Pope & Talbot, Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 51, para. 25
& n.8. See also Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2, at 55-56; Brower, supra
note 62, at 10.
162. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105(1).
163. Brower, supra note 62, at 11. See also Gantz, supra note 40, at 746
(describing Article 1105 as "the most subjective of the relevant bases for liability under
Chapter 11").
As stated elsewhere, the reference to "fair and equitable treatment" in Article 1105(1)
represents the exemplification of an intentionally vague term, designed to give adjudicators
a quasi-legislative authority to articulate a variety of rules necessary to achieve the treaty's
object and purpose in particular disputes. See Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2,
at 56. See also J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (3d ed. 1998) ("When
an arbitrator is asked by the parties to have regard to equitable considerations... he...
begins to assume the role of a legislator, creating law for the case in hand.'); U.N. CTR. ON
TRANSNATIONAL CORPS., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 41 (1988) (It is in the nature of
a very general concept like fair and equitable treatment that there can be no precise
definition. What is fair and what is equitable may largely be a matter of interpretation in
each individual case.'); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES 76
(1992) ('The phrase is vague and its precise content will have to be defined over time
through treaty practice, including perhaps arbitration under the disputes provisions.'); Ian
Brewnlie, Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law, 162 RECUEIL DES COURS
(HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTL L.) 253, 287 (1979) ('The point is a simple one: with little or no
clear content a direction to apply equitable principles is a conferment of a general
discretionary power upon the decision-making body.'); Stephen Vascianne, The Fair and
Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice, 1999 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 99, 142 (In practice, . . . this approach may also mean giving considerable
discretion to the tribunal entrusted with determining whether a breach of the [fair and
equitable] standard has occurred, bearing in mind the subjectivity inherent in the notions of
fairness and equity.').
164. See Kelly, supra note 79, at 529 (observing that creative lawmaking can
diminish respect both for adjudicators and for "the entire system of international law").
See also Josd E. Alvarez, How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded
Trade Regime, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 15 (2001) (discussing the "risks posed ...
when international lawyers permit multilateral dispute settlers to get ahead of
political consensus").
VOL. 3637
20031 STRUCTURE, LEGITIMACY AND NAFTA'S INVESTMENT CHAPTER 67
hoc tribunals creates a considerable likelihood of incoherent
results. 16 5
To illustrate the potential for mischief, one may examine the
melange of views surrounding Article 1105(1). As of this writing, two
tribunals have either linked the concept of "fair and equitable
treatment" to principles of international law or have interpreted it to
prohibit measures deemed arbitrary or unjust from an international
perspective, such as violations of independent treaty obligations
designed to protect investments. 166 A third tribunal took a more
open-ended view, holding that Article 1105(1) prohibits all measures
judged to be unfair or inequitable without regard to international
law. 167 For its part, the Supreme Court of British Columbia adopted
the view that Article 1105(1) only prohibits measures forbidden by
customary international law. 168 NAFTA Parties, on the other hand,
have adopted the narrow view that Article 1105(1) prohibits only
those delicts recognized to violate customary international law in the
1920s-namely, egregious, outrageous, or shocking government
conduct.169
165. See Gantz, supra note 40, at 658 (noting the lack of "any assurance that the
ad hoc arbitral decisions . . . emerging under Chapter 11 will be consistent");
Schneider, supra note 73, at 757 (explaining that "ad hoc . ..arbitration panels ...
have the potential for creating confusion for investors, thus diminishing [the]
predictability" of investor-state arbitration); Mann & von Moltke, manuscript, supra
note 3, at 21 (lamenting the tendency of ad hoc procedures to deprive Chapter 11 of the
"institutional capacity to manage the dispute settlement process"). See also Afilalo,
supra note 2, at 43 (expressing concern about the lack of permanent judicial or political
institutions to manage the Chapter 11 process); Beauvais, supra note 2, at 263
(observing that the absence of binding precedent or appellate procedures increase the
possibility of inconsistent decisions, which correspondingly decrease the likelihood of
predictable operation).
166. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 40, paras. 262-64; Metalclad,
Award, supra note 54, para. 74. See also Brower, supra note 10, at 80-81, 83; Weiler,
supra note 17, at 184; Weiler, supra note 3, at 420-21.
167. See Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, supra note 51, at paras.
110-18. See also F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, 1981 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 243-44.
Despite the apparent breadth of the rule enunciated in its award, the Pope &
Talbot tribunal applied it in a conservative manner, declined "to substitute its
judgment . .. for Canada's," and denied almost all challenges to Canadian export
regulations because they represented a "reasonable response to the circumstances."
See Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, supra note 51, at paras. 121, 123,
125, 128, 155, 185. See also Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2, at 55 n.69;
Weiler, supra note 3, at 415.
168. See Metalclad, Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, supra note
58, paras. 62-65. See also Gantz, supra note 40, at 678.
169. See Pope & Talbot, Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 51, paras. 46
& n.36, 57 & n.40; S.D. Myers, Canada's Memorandum of Fact and Law, supra note 59,
para. 198. See also Weiler, supra note 3, at 426 ("Before each tribunal, lawyers for the
NAFTA parties have unsuccessfully argued that . . .art. 1105[ ] requir[es] no more
than a bare minimum of protection for foreign investments against egregious, shocking
or outrageous government conduct.").
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Although doctrinal incoherence could prove troublesome under
any circumstances, the situation has become particularly acute
following Article 1105(1)'s emergence as the "alpha and omega" of
Chapter 11 disputes.170 As of this writing, every award rendered
against a NAFTA Party rests at least in part on the denial of "fair
and equitable treatment."'171 Similarly, every pending claim alleges a
violation of Article 1105.172 These disputes place over $2 billion in
controversy, and their outcome will influence both future
deplqyments of capital and the regulatory practices of host states. 17 3
Given these high stakes, the inability of ad hoc tribunals to establish
a uniform understanding of Article 1105(1) deals a serious blow to
coherence and predictability, the necessary foundation of legitimacy
for NAFTA's investment chapter. Referring to a similar conflict
between two non-NAFTA awards, one observer remarked that the
situation "brings the law into disrepute, it brings arbitration into
disrepute-the whole thing is highly regrettable."'174
Ad hoc tribunals based on the commercial arbitration model also
create legitimacy concerns due to their perceived failure to conform to
historical practice and to incorporate fundamental values of the
governed community. Although its drafters clearly intended Chapter
11 to benefit from the dignified pedigrees of international commercial
arbitration and the BIT framework, 175 key segments of the governed
community have rejected the validity of these pedigrees due to the
perceived unsuitability of those historical models for Chapter 11
disputes. 176 For example, observers of Chapter 11 routinely argue
that the model of "private," "commercial" arbitration is not suitable
for conducting the public's business.177  For similar reasons,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the NAFTA Parties
routinely cite the public or regulatory character of Chapter 11
170. See Brower, supra note 62, at 9.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See Loewen Group, U.S. Response to Article 1128 Submissions, supra note
62, at 4 (quoting M. Rushton, Clifford Chance Entangled in Bitter Lauder Arbitrations,
LEGAL Bus., Oct. 2001, at 108 (quoting Clifford-Chance partner Jeremy Carver)). See
also MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA'S CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 19 (warning that
"the investor-state arbitration process established by Chapter 11 has an anarchic
aspect that reduces the predictability of any arbitration proceeding").
175. See Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 2, at 471-76; Brower,
Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2, at 69-74.
176. As explained above, perceived dissonance between historical models and
reality render pedigrees incapable of conferring symbolic validity. See supra notes 93-
97 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA'S CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 6,
14; PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 37, 39; Cremades & Cairns,
supra note 3, at 183, 184-85, 192-93, 195-96, 208-09; Dhooge, supra note 48, at 278-79;
Fracassi, supra note 66, at 220-21; Soloway, Challenge of Private Party Participation,
supra note 3, at 11; Tollefson, supra note 17, at 162; Beauvais, supra note 2, at 262.
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disputes to justify derogation from practices long accepted as key
features of international commercial arbitration.17
8
Likewise, while the BIT network theoretically establishes a
precedent for resolving investment disputes through commercial
arbitration, 7 9 observers might reject its validity based on a key
difference between most BITs and Chapter 11. Most BITs govern the
relations between investors from developed states and their
developing host states, 80 which generally lack mature regulatory
systems and high volumes of cross-border investment. Under these
circumstances, investment disputes may not be frequent and may not
interfere with the core activities of host governments. 18 1 By contrast,
Chapter 11 governs relations between foreign investors and host
states with mature regulatory systems and high volumes of cross-
178. For example, when seeking authorization for third-party participation in the
proceedings, the NAF'A Parties and NGOs have encouraged tribunals to disregard the
practices of international commercial arbitration and to adopt an approach more suited to
disputes involving matters of public interest. United Parcel Serv. of Am. v. Canada,
Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae
(Oct. 17, 2001), paras. 21, 23-24, 34, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter
United Parcel, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as
Amici Curiae]; Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from
Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae" (Jan. 15, 2001), paras. 5, 8, 17, available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter Methanex, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions
from Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae']
Similarly, when discussing the level of judicial scrutiny appropriate for tribunal
awards, the NAFTA Parties and many critics argue that courts should disregard the
deferential approach of commercial arbitration and, instead, adopt a level of
supervision more suited to the public character of Chapter 11 disputes. See S.D.
Myers, Canada's Memorandum of Fact and Law, supra note 59, paras. 119-20, 140-41;
S.D. Myers, Mexico's Memorandum of Fact and Law, supra note 59, paras 53-61. See
also infra notes 186, 211 and accompanying text; Tollefson, supra note 24, at 203-04,
221-22.
179. See Paterson, supra note 3, at 118. See also Brower & Steven, supra note
40, at 193 (describing Chapter 11 as "but another example of an evolving consensus
regarding international investment regulation"); Cremades & Cairns, supra note 3, at
176 (describing the proliferation of BITs and concluding that investor-state arbitration
has become "an established . . . feature of modern international commercial
arbitration"); Sandrino, supra note 117, at 324 (recognizing that "the combination of
the BIT movement and the investment provisions in NAFTA may be seen as part of an
ongoing process to create a new international framework for the regulation of foreign
direct investment").
180. See Brower & Steven, supra note 40, at 194-95; Price, supra note 117, at
113; Weiler, supra note 3, at 406.
181. The governments of developed states virtually never had to respond to
investment disputes under BITs because the capital flows subject to them ran almost
exclusively from developed states to developing states, not vice versa. See Brower &
Steven, supra note 40, at 194-95; Weiler, supra note 3, at 406. But see Jos6 Luis
Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal Protection of Foreign Investment, 24 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 255, 258, 270-71 (1994) (observing theoretically that BITs "may be signed
between states of similar development," that capital importing states may become
capital exporting states, and that BITs create a situation of legal parity between states
parties).
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border investment. In this situation, investment disputes will arise
more often, 8 2 and are more likely to intrude on the core activities of
host governments. 183 These facts arguably support descriptions of
Chapter 11 as a "new type of commercial arbitration" that "differs
fundamentally from traditional international commercial
arbitration."'1 4 To its most ardent critics, Chapter 11 thus embodies
a new and revolutionary regime that "acutely craves," but can never
obtain, "authentication by ancient anachronisms."'18 5
Even if international commercial arbitration and the BIT
framework supplied a valid pedigree for Chapter 11 disputes,
perceptions of legitimacy would still depend on views about tribunals'
adherence to the rituals established by those systems and
incorporated into Chapter 11. In this respect, the nature of ad hoc
tribunals raises additional concerns: the short terms of service and
the absence of a serious and permanent secretariat impair the
development of the levels of expertise that characterize standing
tribunals. 8 6 Under these circumstances, the governed community
may fear that inexperienced tribunals will be prone to deviate from
the prescribed rituals so seriously as to change the nature of the
arbitral process. While the Author finds such views uncompelling,
the NAFTA Parties apparently do not.18 7 In any event, the point is
182. See Brower & Steven, supra note 40, at 195 (asserting that the high level of
cross-border investment between Canada and the United States made "inevitable" the
possibility that the two governments would have to defend themselves before Chapter
11 tribunals).
183. See Banks, supra note 50, at 504 (arguing that "it is difficult to separate the
regulations impugned by [Chapter 111 claims from types of regulations that form
longstanding parts of the legal and social landscape in North America"); William T.
Warren, Paying to Regulate: A Guide to Methanex v. United States and NAFTA
Investor Rights, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10986 (2001) (stating that the Chapter 11 claims
brought against the United States "challenge core ... government functions"). See also
William S. Dodge, International Decision, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 186, 191 (2001) (observing
that Chapter l's negotiators assumed-incorrectly-that investment disputes would
arise infrequently and would not challenge important national policies).
184. Cremades & Cairns, supra note 3, at 183.
185. FRANCK, supra note 71, at 109. See also Stephan, supra note 79, at 797-98
(explaining that "[a]ll legal claims use a vocabulary that implies ancient usage, no
matter how innovative the underlying effort").
186. See S.D. Myers, Canada's Memorandum of Fact and Law, supra note 59,
paras. 135, 137 (arguing that Chapter 11 tribunals "should not attract extensive
judicial deference" because such ad hoc bodies "are not standing tribunals with
established or recognized expertise" and their members "are not necessarily chosen for
their knowledge of trade law"). See also infra note 211 and accompanying text.
187. In recent annulment proceedings, Canada and Mexico seem to have
advanced this view by emphasizing the tribunals' lack of expertise and their purported
failure to apply the governing law, thus resulting in a usurpation of jurisdiction. See
S.D. Myers, Canada's Memorandum of Fact and Law, supra note 59, paras. 6, 63, 117-
18, 135, 137, 152-221; S.D. Myers, Mexico's Memorandum of Fact and Law, supra note
59, paras. 29, 47, 49-50, 82-88, 129-63. See also supra note 186 and infra notes 211,
250-51 and accompanying text; Tollefson, supra note 24, at 212.
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that if important segments of the governed community come to
perceive ad hoc tribunals as too inexperienced to follow complicated
rules and procedures, those tribunals will not enjoy legitimacy.
If the governed community does not see Chapter 11 tribunals as
conforming to historical practice, adherence to fundamental values,
such as accountability, transparency, and democratic participation,
becomes an element essential to the perceived legitimacy of investor-
state arbitration.18 8 In this respect, the use of ad hoc tribunals
generates further concerns. Brief periods of service and low
expectations of future service decrease the perceived accountability of
tribunal members.1 8 9  Brief periods of service may also enable
tribunal members to resist calls for greater transparency and
democratic participation. 190 The remaining features of Chapter 11 do
little to promote transparency or participation because they give the
public no right to receive copies of pleadings, evidence, or written
arguments, much less to take part in the proceedings. 19 1  The
Additional Facility and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules further
undermine transparency and participation by requiring closed
hearings in the absence of party consent.192  Under these
188. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (describing conformity to
historical practice and incorporation of fundamental values as necessary alternatives).
189. See Cremades & Cairns, supra note 3, at 195 (mentioning "arbitration's
lack of democratic accountability"); Peterson, supra note 117 (describing Chapter 11
tribunals as "secretive and unaccountable"); Mann & von Moltke, manuscript, supra
note 3, at 21 (describing the level of arbitrators' accountability as "severely
attenuated").
190. See Beauvais, supra note 2, at 263 (complaining that the work of Chapter
11 tribunals "is largely insulated from public scrutiny or public participation"). See
also Mann & von Moltke, manuscript, supra note 3, at 22 (discussing the "highly
significant" absence of "institutions that might promote a sense of collective
responsibility" among the members of Chapter 11 tribunals).
191. Chapter 11 specifically grants non-disputing NAFTA Parties the right of
access to all pleadings, evidence, and written arguments submitted during the course
of the proceedings, as well as the right to make submissions on questions regarding the
interpretation of NAFTA. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1127, 1128, 1129. The
negative implication is that no one else enjoys those rights of access and participation.
See United Parcel, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and
Participation as Amici Curiae, supra note 178, paras. 61-62, 70, 73 ("Under Chapter 11
and the UNCITRAL Rules provision is made for the communication of pleadings,
documents and evidence to the other disputing party, the other NAFTA Parties, the
Tribunal and the Secretariat-and to no one else."). See also Clarkson, supra note 2, at
381 ("Transparency is the first victim in this secret world of commercial arbitration.
Proceedings are held in camera. The briefs that document the parties' pleadings and
even the existence of a case may be kept secret, if the parties so wish."); Gantz, supra
note 40, at 659 ("[G]iven the lack of transparency of the arbitral process under NAFTA,
some of the essential facts and arguments of the parties may not be publicly
available.").
192. See Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, art. 39(1), (2), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/47.htm; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art.
25(4), available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm; Wagner, supra note 47, at
476. See also Clarkson, supra note 2, at 384 ("Exclusion of citizens from [Chapter 11
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circumstances, a broad coalition of forces has called for "greater
public participation and transparency in the arbitral process, ' 193
which some now describe as a form of "secret government.' 1 94
In an effort to burnish the image of NAFTA's investment
chapter, two tribunals concluded in principle that they possess the
authority to accept amicus curiae briefs. 195 While this may represent
a welcome development, 196 one should not overestimate the resulting
benefits to transparency and democratic participation. First, because
the tribunals did not give potential amici the right to receive
pleadings or to attend hearings, 197 the decisions contribute little to
the promotion of transparency. Second, because potential amici have
no right to obtain pleadings and because the recent decisions only
contemplate the receipt of helpful submissions, 198 one wonders (1)
proceedings] is a further de-legitimizing feature."). In an earlier time, people may have
regarded this lack of transparency and participation as a positive feature that
promoted the depoliticization of investment disputes. See Ian Laird, NAFTA Chapter
11 Meets Chicken Little, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223, 225 (2001).
193. Tollefson, supra note 24, at 185. See also MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA'S
CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 49; PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at
11, 20; Dhooge, supra note 48, at 278-79; Fracassi, supra note 66, at 221-22; Tollefson,
supra note 17, at 163; Beauvais, supra note 2, at 293; Mann & von Moltke, manuscript,
supra note 3, at 19-20.
194. See Anthony DePalma, NAFTA 's Powerful Little Secret: Obscure Tribunals
Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, § 3, at 1
(quoting the president of Public Citizen); Ferguson, supra note 40, at 515 (quoting the
statement of a World Wildlife Fund official to the effect that Chapter 11 "is being used
to rewrite important public policies behind closed doors"). See also Clarkson, supra
note 2, at 377 (describing Chapter 11 disputes as a "zone of largely secretive
adjudication"); Cremades & Cairns, supra note 3, at 195, 197 (discussing the
allegations of "excessive secrecy" and predicting an increase in complaints about "secret
and anonymous tribunals," as well as "fears of the erosion of democracy and
sovereignty").
195. See United Parcel, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention
and Participation as Amici Curiae, supra note 178, paras. 61-62, 70, 73; Methanex,
Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici
Curiae," supra note 178, at paras. 31, 39, 47, 49, 53. See also Cremades & Cairns,
supra note 3, at 198-99; Duncan B. Hollis, Private Actors in Public International Law:
Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty, 25 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 235, 241-42 (2002); Tollefson, supra note 24, at 204; Tollefson, supra
note 17, at 164; Beauvais, supra note 2, at 293.
196. Acceptance of amicus submissions at least deprives critics of the
opportunity to lambaste tribunals for undue secrecy. See Methanex, Decision of the
Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae," supra note
178, para. 49.
197. See United Parcel, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention
and Participation as Amici Curiae, supra note 178, paras. 67-69; Methanex, Decision of
the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae," supra
note 178, paras. 41-42, 46-47. See also Cremades & Cairns, supra note 3, at 199;
Tollefson, supra note 17, at 164.
198. See United Parcel, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention
and Participation as Amici Curiae, supra note 178, paras. 61, 70; Methanex, Decision of
the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae," supra
note 178, para. 48.
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whether potential amici can formulate informed submissions, 199 (2)
whether tribunals will accept uninformed submissions, and (3)
whether the recent decisions really advance the cause of meaningful
participation. Third, assuming that tribunals will accept amicus
submissions from NGOs, this may not promote democratic
participation because many NGOs have very specific agendas and are
not accountable to their own members, 200 much less to the general
public. 201  Thus, despite their best efforts, Chapter l's ad hoc
tribunals may seem illegitimate because they do not serve the
fundamental values of accountability, transparency, and democratic
participation.
202
To summarize, arbitral tribunals promote legitimacy by
supplying a process for resolving the textual indeterminacy of
NAFTA's investment chapter. On the other hand, the use of ad hoc
tribunals based on the format for commercial arbitration may seem
illegitimate because they have rendered incoherent decisions on a
crucial issue, lack a pedigree accepted as valid by important segments
of the governed community, seem incrementally more prone to
deviate from rituals, and fail to incorporate certain fundamental
values of the governed community. Although one rightly may
attribute these infelicities to the structure of Chapter 11 rather than
to the personal shortcomings of tribunal members, they raise
concerns about legitimacy, which, if not resolved, might herald the
demise of NAFTA's investment chapter.
199. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 56
(expressing concern that NGOs may lack "sufficient accurate information ... to make
... submissions in an informed manner").
200. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 102, at 571.
201. See Atik, supra note 103, at 458-59. See also Cremades & Cairns, supra
note 3, at 178-79 (defining NGOs as organizations "devoted to specific issues ... or to
representing particular interests"). In some circles, NGOs have the reputation of
"meddling groups" that "seek to impose their views" on others. See Daniel D. Bradlow,
"The Times They Are A-Changing." Some Preliminary Thoughts on Developing
Countries, NGOs and the Reform of the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 503, 504
(2001).
202. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 7, 60
(explaining that "the absence of transparency leads to a significant loss of democratic
legitimacy" and predicting that the "secretive process" would, "like a cancer, . . erode
the democratic legitimacy of the entire international ...investment regime"); Afilalo,
supra note 2, at 42, 52 (stating that ad hoc arbitration panels lack the "legitimacy,"
"transparency," and "accountability" of national courts); Cremades & Cairns, supra
note 3, at 196, 208-09 (describing the "lack of democratic credibility or public
accountability" as the "Achilles heel" of international arbitration, and calling for reform
of the arbitral process); Beauvais, supra note 2, at 255-56 (referring to Chapter 11
tribunals as "unaccountable" and "non-transparent"). See also PRIVATE RIGHTS,
PUBLIC PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 37, 44 (referring to the "absence of democratic
safeguards" in investor-state arbitration under Chapter 11, which "excludes
guarantees of public participation and in which secrecy is the guiding principle").
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C. Legitimacy and the NAFTA Parties: Antidote or Toxin?
Chapter 11's drafters gave the NAFTA Parties two mechanisms
to remedy the legitimacy concerns raised by ad hoc tribunals. First,
Article 1136(3) permits losing NAFTA Parties to seek revision or
annulment-but not appeal--of awards by municipal courts at the
seat of arbitration.20 3 While this limited form of judicial control does
not provide an opportunity to cure doctrinal incoherence, supply
pedigrees, or promote the incorporation of fundamental values, it
does allow courts to review the arbitral proceedings for gross
procedural defects;20 4 in other words, it promotes adherence to ritual.
Second, Article 1131(2) authorizes the Free Trade Commission-the
trade ministers of the three NAFTA Parties acting in concert-to
issue binding interpretations of NAFTA provisions, which then
become part of the governing law in Chapter 11 disputes. 205 This tool
offers a potential cure for doctrinal incoherence, 20 6 may enhance the
203. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1136(3). In international practice, "revision"
differs from appeal in that it requires discovery of "decisive" new facts that were
unknown to the tribunal and the party seeking revision. J.L. SIMPSON & HAZEL Fox,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 242 (1959). Also, revision does not permit the reweighing
of facts or law. Id.
In modern international practice, courts may use "annulment" to rectify gross
procedural injustices (such as excess of jurisdiction or denial of the right of audience),
but not mistakes of law. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 708-09 (2d ed. 2001); JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT
OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 257-59 (1999); W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 502-03 (3d ed. 2000); ALAN
REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 434 (3d ed. 1999). See also Park, supra note 152, at 235 ("Courts should
exercise . . . control . . . over the arbitration's basic procedural integrity (looking at
matters such as bias, excess of authority and due process), but should not second guess
the arbitrator on the substantive merits of the dispute.").
In the past, some observers identified "essential error" as a ground for annulment.
See SIMPSON & FOX, supra, at 250, 256. But see JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 98 (1929) (expressing the view that "no
authority" believes that an award "may be attacked because of erroneous appreciation
either of the facts or of the law applicable to them"). One may attribute this practice to
the need for judicial control over arbitrators who, at that time, often had no legal
training. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra, at 436 n.13. Even this practice did not,
however, permit annulment based on routine errors of fact or law. See SIMPSON & Fox,
supra, at 256-57.
By contrast, an "appeal" suggests the opportunity to reexamine "any aspect of a
decision with full opportunity accorded to the parties to argue." W. MICHAEL REISMAN,
NULLITY AND REVISION 212 (1971).
204. See supra note 203.
205. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131(2).
206. See U.S. Post-Hearing Submission (ADF), supra note 62, at 10. See also
MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 47 (describing
interpretive statements as the only short-term solution to "the uncertainties created by
the language in Chapter 11"); Dodge, supra note 67, at 191 (urging the NAFTA Parties
to use interpretive statements to resolve doctrinal incoherence, "thus providing
guidance and predictability for future cases").
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pedigree of the rules as interpreted,20 7 and may promote the
incorporation of fundamental values by introducing a measure-
albeit an indirect measure-of democratic accountability and
participation into the Chapter 11 process. 20 8 In short, annulment
proceedings and binding interpretations hold the promise of elixirs
that theoretically could alleviate the legitimacy crisis in NAFTA's
investment chapter. Ironically, however, their use to date has
prompted claimants, tribunals, and observers to accuse the NAFTA
Parties of making illegitimate attempts to subvert the Chapter 11
process.
Although Chapter 11 employs annulment proceedings to enhance
the legitimacy of the arbitral process, that strategy will succeed only
if the NAFTA Parties and their courts strictly observe the ritual of
limited review. 20 9  While any deviation from that ritual would
undermine the legitimacy of annulment proceedings, the blow would
be particularly severe if motivated by a desire to gratify the short-
term self-interest of the NAFTA Parties. 210  Given these
qualifications, the drawbacks of judicial control of Chapter 11 awards
by municipal courts of the NAFTA Parties seem obvious. In both of
the annulment proceedings now completed or underway, the
government of the judicial forum-Canada-has appeared as an
interested party, has essentially described Chapter 11 tribunals as
illegitimate institutions, and has requested a level of judicial scrutiny
not compatible with the letter or the spirit of NAFTA's investment
chapter. In Canada's trenchant words to its own courts,
[t]he NAFTA architecture indicates that the awards of Chapter 11 tribunals
about public measures are not supposed to be worthy of judicial deference and
not supposed to be protected by a high standard of review. Chapter Eleven
Tribunals do not exhibit the features of a specialised or expert administrative
tribunal. Chapter Eleven Tribunals are currently appointed ad hoc and for
single cases. There is no Chapter Eleven secretariat or in-house specialists or
other institutional hallmark of expertise or special authority. This contrasts
with the standing secretariat of the World Trade Organization supporting its
dispute settlement panels or the staff supporting permanent domestic
administrative tribunals .... 211
Such words reveal the untenable conflict of interest for the
government of the judicial forum. As the representative of an
interested party, the government's counsel must take all steps to
207. See Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 70, at 727 (explaining that "a new rule
may be taken more seriously if it arrives on the scene under the aegis of a particularly
venerable sponsor").
208. See Kelly, supra note 79, at 527-28 (recognizing that the possibility of
legislative revision mitigates the democratic problems of judicial rulemaking).
209. See Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 70, at 735-36.
210. Id. at 725.
211. Canada's Outline of Argument (Metalclad), supra note 58, para. 25.
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avoid liability.2 12 On the other hand, as a NAFTA Party, the same
government has an obligation to perform its treaty obligations in good
faith, and to encourage its courts to do the same. Some observers
claim that government attorneys must resolve this ethical dilemma
by discharging their "responsibility for the integrity of the
international legal system. '213 Others, including the NAFTA Parties,
assume that government lawyers remain free,2 14 or at least more
likely,2 15 to favor their obligations as hired guns. Yet when they
choose that path and urge their own courts to second-guess the merits
of Chapter 11 awards, the NAFTA Parties arguably violate their
treaty obligations, 2 16 appear to suborn derogation from ritual, and,
212. Cf. Christopher M. Koa, The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and Dispute Resolution: Conciliating and Arbitrating with China
Through the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 24 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 439, 471 (1991) (indicating that "[t]he very availability of [ICSID's
annulment] procedure . . . virtually requires the professionally ethical counsel to
recommend its vigorous exploitation" (quoting W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of
the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739, 787)).
213. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, Testing and Development of
"Exotic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1956, 1970-71 (1989).
214. See Pope & Talbot, Ruling Concerning Investor's Motion to Change Place of
Arbitration, supra note 67, at paras. 11-13 (recounting Canada's contention that it had
a procedural right to request annulment proceedings and to seek lower standards of
judicial deference from its own courts). See also Thomas, supra note 2, at 459-60
(quoting an unpublished decision of the tribunal in Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico, which
seems to accept the propriety of such conduct).
215. See Gantz, supra note 50 (claiming that "the practice of challenging adverse
decisions (S.D. Myers and Metalclad) in national courts . . . is understandable, given
the tendency of government lawyers, like all attorneys, to resort to all available
remedies").
216. As one Chapter 11 tribunal has ruled, the NAFTA Parties are not mere
litigants in annulment proceedings, but also parties that have obligations to maintain
the integrity of Chapter 11. Pope & Talbot, Ruling Concerning Investor's Motion to
Change Place of Arbitration, supra note 67, para. 18. Furthermore, the positions taken
by the NAFTA Parties in litigation before their own courts may be critical in
determining whether they have fulfilled their treaty obligations. See id. paras. 18-19.
See also United Parcel, Decision of the Tribunal on the Place of Arbitration, supra note
67, paras. 8, 10 (indicating that the tribunal was "troubled" by positions taken by the
Canadian Government before its own courts in the Metalclad annulment proceedings).
Other international tribunals have expressed similar views and have imposed
liability on states for not sufficiently encouraging their own courts to recognize or
enforce the results of treaty-based adjudication. See LaGrand Case (Gr. v. U.S.), 2001
I.C.J., paras. 112, 115 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
igus/igusframe.htm (ruling that the United States breached its obligation to take all
measures at its disposal to implement the court's order for provisional measures and
citing "the Solicitor General's categorical statement ... to the United States Supreme
Court that 'an order of the International Court of Justice indicating provisional
measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial relief"); Iran v. United
States, Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep., paras. 66-71 (1998), available in 1998 WL 1157733
(holding that judicial second-guessing of a Tribunal award violated the submission to
final and binding arbitration and suggesting that the U.S. Government could have
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thus, undermine the legitimacy of annulment proceedings. 217
Turning to the judicial fora themselves, the situation does not
improve. Although they may have laudable traditions of
independence, 2 18 the courts of the NAFTA Parties lack experience in
international affairs, which, combined with constitutional doctrine,
supports a strong policy of judicial deference to their own
governments' views on matters of international law. 219 While this
policy may be eminently reasonable in most situations, it becomes
problematic when applied to annulment proceedings that require or
permit the government to appear as an interested party. At the very
least, these circumstances encourage the courts of the NAFTA Parties
to violate the most fundamental tenet of procedural justice common to
international law,220 Chapter 11,221 and the pertinent rules of
arbitration:2 22 equality of treatment of the parties. One may
attribute this problem not to the venality of the NAFTA Parties or
their courts, but rather to the treaty's provision for judicial control by
municipal courts, which unhappily juxtaposes the NAFTA Parties'
roles as litigants and as states parties. Yet that does not change the
result: a regrettable, systematic predisposition to approach and
avoided liability by filing a statement of interest explaining to its courts why the
tribunal's award deserved enforcement).
217. Extensive judicial review also undermines the legitimacy of investor-state
arbitration by impairing the capacity of the process to produce final (that is to say,
"determinate") outcomes. See Gantz, supra note 40, at 685 (predicting that "the extent
of the finality and the usefulness of NAFTA tribunal awards . . . will remain an open
question until the scope of court review . . . is better defined through experience"). See
also COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 203, at 257 (observing that "the prospect of
annulment weakens the utility of an award as a final disposition of the dispute").
218. In the past, observers questioned the independence of Mexican courts. See
Mann, supra note 47, at 402 (noting that Mexican courts were "generally considered
corrupt or at least compliant with the will of the state"). See also Soloway,
Environmental Trade Barriers Under NAFTA, supra note 3, at 88.
219. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 130; Kelly, supra note 79, at 506. See also
Afilalo, supra note 2, at 52 (acknowledging that "national courts may tend to favor [the
views of] their own governments"); Ganguly, supra note 17, at 125 (recognizing that the
judiciaries of host states may be "sympathetic to the government's cause").
220. See Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 2, at 486; Charles H.
Brower, II, International Immunities: Some Dissident Views on the Role of Municipal
Courts, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 87 (2000); John P. Gaffney, Due Process in the World Trade
Organization: The Need for Procedural Justice in the Dispute Settlement System, 14
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1173, 1179, 1195 (1999).
221. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1115 (establishing a "mechanism for the
settlement of investment disputes that assures ... equal treatment among investors of
the Parties in accordance with the principle of international reciprocity").
222. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Decision and Order by the Tribunal
(Mar. 11, 2002), para. 16 n.6, available at http://www.appletonlaw.com4b3P&T.htm;
Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Decision by Tribunal (Sept. 6, 2000), para. 1.5
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm.
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conduct judicial proceedings on the basis of self-interest and,
therefore, undermine the legitimacy of annulment proceedings. 22 3
While the use of binding interpretations holds great theoretical
promise for enhancing the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration, the
Free Trade Commission mechanism, as applied by the NAFTA
Parties to date, lacks certain elements of legitimacy. The want of a
pedigree represents the Free Trade Commission's most obvious, but
least significant, shortcoming.2 24  More important is the
Commission's evident promulgation of interpretations that lack
textual determinacy. As noted above, the Free Trade Commission
purported to adopt the following three interpretations on July 31,
2001:
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum
standard of treatment ....
2. The concept[ I of "fair and equitable treatment" ... do[es] not
require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required
by the customary international law minimum standard of
treatment ....
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another
provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international
agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of
Article 1105(1).225
Unfortunately, these Notes contain significant ambiguities that
merely increase the room for debate. For example, the NAFTA
Parties construe the Notes to require sitting and future tribunals to
decide claims based on the principles that (1) "international law"
means "customary international law";2 26 (2) "fair and equitable
treatment" corresponds to outdated customary rules prohibiting only
"egregious," "outrageous," and "shocking" government conduct;22 7 and
(3) external treaty provisions have absolutely no relevance to the
application of Article 1105(1).228 As the Author has observed
223. See Dodge, supra note 67, at 916, 918 (noting that the court's decision in
the Metalclad annulment proceedings was "not principled' and wondering "whether it
is appropriate to allow national courts to review Chapter 11 awards").
224. See Charles N. Brower et al., The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication
System, 19 ARB. INT'L (forthcoming 2003) (describing the Free Trade Commission's
"unique" role as a control mechanism).
225. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
226. See U.S. Post-Hearing Submission (ADF), supra note 62, at 13-16; S.D.
Myers, Canada's Memorandum of Fact and Law, supra note 59, paras. 205-06.
227. See U.S. Post-Hearing Submission (ADF), supra note 62, at 2-4; S.D. Myers,
Canada's Memorandum of Fact and Law, supra note 59, para. 200. See also supra note
62 and accompanying text.
228. See S.D. Myers, Canada's Memorandum of Fact and Law, supra note 59,
paras. 205-07; Methanex, Canada's Third Article 1128 Submission, supra note 63, para.
13; Methanex Corp. v. United States, Rejoinder of Respondent United States to
Methanex's Reply Submission Concerning the NAFTA Free Trade Commission's July
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elsewhere, however, tribunals might interpret the Notes differently.
For instance, they might read the Notes to confirm the view that
Article 1105(1) represents a statement of opinio juris to the effect
that, through widespread incorporation into BITs, the conventional
standard of "fair and equitable treatment" has become a rule of
customary international law. 229 Likewise, even if the breach of
separate treaty obligations does not per se "establish" a violation of
Article 1105, tribunals might still characterize treaty violations as
relevant, perhaps even strong, evidence of unfair and inequitable
treatment. 230 Whatever one's position on the merits of this debate,
the point is that the Free Trade Commission so far has not proven
adept at formulating determinate-that is legitimate-
interpretations. As a result, it has also failed to perform the intended
function of eliminating the doctrinal incoherence that gnaws at the
legitimacy of Chapter 11 tribunals.
To make matters worse, the NAFTA Parties arguably have
violated the single prescribed ritual for the adoption of binding
interpretations by the Free Trade Commission. That ritual involves
31, 2001 Interpretation (Dec. 17, 2001), at 8, available at http:/www.state.gov/
documents/organization7027.pdf. See also S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Submission of
the United States (Sept. 18, 2001), para. 12, available at http://www.state.gov
documents/organization/6029.pdf (asserting that Chapter 11 tribunals lack the
authority even to "address" violations of other chapters of NAFTA).
229. Brower, supra note 62, at 10. Some believe that widespread references to
"fair and equitable treatment" in BITs have transformed the conventional rule into a
principle of customary international law. See Pope & Talbot, Award in Respect of
Damages, supra note 51, paras. 54, 61-62; Weiler, supra note 3, at 417 n.34, 434.
Nevertheless, Chapter I l's drafters might have deemed a statement of opinio juris
to be necessary because such assertions remain a matter of substantial debate. See
U.S. Post-Hearing Submission (ADF), supra note 62, at 20-21 (arguing that the
practices memorialized in BITs lack opinio juris and, therefore, do not support the
development of customary international law); Memorial of the Investor (ADF), supra
note 127, para. 239 (asserting that customary international law does not require "fair
and equitable" treatment of investments). See also Vascianne, supra note 163, at 157,
160, 163-64 (observing that "the presence of the fair and equitable standard in the vast
majority of [BITs] could arguably demonstrate that States accept the standard as
legally binding' under customary international law, but noting "cogent countervailing
arguments" and concluding that "the better view is that the fair and equitable
standard has not passed into the corpus of customary law").
230. See Methanex, Second Opinion of Professor Sir Robert Jennings, supra note
68, at 4; Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Joint Reply of Claimants to the
November 9, 2001 Article 1128 Submissions of Canada and Mexico (Dec. 7, 2001), at
12, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6919.pdf; Brower, supra
note 62, at 10. See also MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFrA'S CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at
31 (explaining that the minimum standard overlaps with disciplines on national
treatment, MFN treatment, and expropriation); Gantz, supra note 40, at 747 (stating
that discriminatory treatment that violates the obligation of national treatment may
also constitute unfair and inequitable treatment); Tollefson, supra note 24, at 213
(observing that the Notes do not prohibit tribunals from considering whether conduct
that breaches other treaty provisions might also constitute unfair or inequitable
treatment for purposes of Article 1105).
80 VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
the NAFTA Parties' obligation to interpret the NAFTA "in accordance
with applicable rules of international law,"231 which evidently include
the customary rules of treaty interpretation set forth in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).232 Thus, the
members of the Free Trade Commission must interpret words
according to their ordinary meaning taken in context, in light of the
treaty's object and purpose, and with reference to all relevant
international obligations governing relations among the NAFTA
Parties. 233 Yet, some observers believe that the NAFTA Parties must
have ignored this ritual because the prescribed rules of construction
cannot reasonably sustain an interpretation that collapses "fair and
equitable treatment" into everything short of the most unimaginable
forms of government misconduct.234 In fact, the Notes, as qualified
by the NAFTA Parties in their submissions to tribunals, seem more
consistent with the NAFTA Parties' routine demand that tribunals
strictly construe Chapter 11 to minimize intrusions onto
sovereignty. 2 35 Although the rule of strict construction prevailed in
231. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102(2).
232. See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Decision on Hearing of
Respondent's Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction (Jan. 5, 2001), paras. 50-51,
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter Loewen Group, Decision on
Hearing of Respondent's Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction]; S.D. Myers,
Partial Award, supra note 40, paras. 196-204; Metalclad, Award, supra note 54, para.
70; Waste Mgmt., Award, supra note 52, § 9; Ethyl Corp., Award on Jurisdiction, supra
note 65, paras. 55-56. See also Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 2, at 468;
Brower, supra note 62, at 9; Gantz, supra note 40, at 689; Weiler, supra note 3, at 428.
233. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1)-(3),
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340; Metalclad, Award, supra note 54, para. 70. See also Loewen
Group, Decision on Hearing of Respondent's Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction,
supra note 232, para. 51; S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 40, paras. 196-204;
Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 2, at 469; Brower, supra note 62, at 9.
234. See Claimant's Post Hearing Submission (ADF), supra note 68, paras. 12,
15, 75 & n.65; Brower, supra note 62, at 11; Weiler, supra note 3, at 428-29. See also
ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, Notice of Arbitration (July 19, 2000), para. 55,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/3351.pdf ("The provision is in
no way limited to egregious conduct alone and applies to any treatment that is not in
itself 'fair' and 'equitable."').
235. See Brower, supra note 62, at 11. See also Loewen Group, Decision on
Hearing of Respondent's Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction, supra note 232,
para. 51 (refusing to accept the United States' submission that "NAFTA is to be
understood in accordance with the principle that treaties are to be interpreted in
deference to the sovereignty of states"); Ethyl Corp., Award on Jurisdiction, supra note
65, para. 55 & n.20 (rejecting Canada's arguments in favor of strict construction);
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Memorial on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of
Respondent United States (Nov. 13, 2000), at 13-14, available at http://www.state.gov
documents/organization3949.doc (conceding that the doctrine of restrictive
interpretation has become obsolete in state-to-state disputes, but urging its application
to investor-state disputes); Andrea K. Bjorklund, Contract Without Privity: Sovereign
Offer and Investor Acceptance, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 183, 191 (2001) ("States Parties are
likely to continue urging narrow construction of ... Chapter [11], and are justified in so
doing."). Ms. Bjorklund was an attorney-adviser who represented the United States in
Chapter 11 disputes.
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another era, it has no place in the modern law of treaty
interpretation. 236  If, as seems possible, the Notes rest on the
principle of strict interpretation, the members of the Free Trade
Commission have deviated from ritual in a way that undermines the
legitimacy of their work.
Even if the NAFTA Parties had followed the rituals of
interpretation, another difficulty would remain-namely, the Free
Trade Commission's own failure to adopt procedures that serve the
fundamental values of accountability, transparency, and democratic
participation. 237  These circumstances enabled the Free Trade
Commission to issue the Notes "out of the blue," "without any prior
public consultation," and without giving "any warning to investors
party to ongoing Chapter Eleven arbitrations. '238  Furthermore,
because the Notes appeared at a critical juncture in several
arbitrations, 2 39 and because the NAFTA Parties have insisted on
their application to pending disputes, 240 the Free Trade Commission's
work appears less of a principled exercise in international governance
than a clever fait accompli designed to avoid liability.2 41 Thus, the
236. See Loewen Group, Decision on Hearing of Respondent's Objection to
Competence and Jurisdiction, supra note 232, para. 51; Ethyl Corp., Award on
Jurisdiction, supra note 65, para. 55. See also Brower, supra note 62, at 11.
237. See PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 20 (describing
the lack of public access to-and accountability of-the Free Trade Commission).
238. ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, Investor's Reply to the Counter-
Memorial of the United States on Competence and Liability (Jan. 28, 2002), para. 213,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/7920.pdf [hereinafter
Investor's Reply on Competence and Liability (ADF)]. See also Letter from Robert J.
Keyes, President and CEO, Canadian Council for International Business, and Nancy
Hughes Anthony, President and CEO, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, to Hon. Pierre
Pettigrew, Minister for International Trade 2 (Aug. 15, 2002) (on file with the author)
(asserting that the Notes were prepared "without the benefit of substantive
consultations with the business community").
Apparently, the NAFTA Parties did not even warn existing tribunals about the
impending adoption of the Notes, then submitted them to existing tribunals without
any comment or explanation, and finally declined to respond to certain questions posed
by one tribunal about the Notes and their provenance. See Pope & Talbot, Award in
Respect of Damages, supra note 51, paras. 10, 28 n.17.
239. See Weiler, supra note 3, at 422 (observing that the U.S. government
agreed to the Notes due to "a growing concern among State Department lawyers that
as many as three more tribunals might soon be issuing awards that would find
breaches of NAFTA art. 1105 by the United States").
240. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
241. See Methanex, Second Opinion of Professor Sir Robert Jennings, supra note
68, at 4-5 (concluding that the NAFTA Parties "quite evidently organized a dbmarch
[sic] intended to apply pressure on the tribunal to find in a certain direction by
amending the treaty" and concluding that this conduct violates "the most elementary
rules of ... due process"); Investor's Reply on Competence and Liability (ADFl, supra
note 238, para. 215 (arguing that the Free Trade Commission adopted the Notes "for
the clear purpose of limiting the liability of the [NAFTA] Parties ... at the expense and
prejudice of the investors that are the beneficiaries of the Treaty"). See also U.S. Post-
Hearing Submission (ADF), supra note 62, at 18 (acknowledging that the Commission
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NAFTA Parties have not merely used secretive, closed procedures to
conduct the work of the Free Trade Commission, they also have used
the Commission as a tool to gratify narrow self-interests. 242 Under
these circumstances, the Free Trade Commission's work now appears
to serve as a "mere hunting license[ ] for [the NAFTA Parties] to do
whatever they wish. '2 43
To recapitulate, annulment proceedings and binding
interpretations hold the potential to mitigate several of the legitimacy
concerns raised by Chapter 11 tribunals. Whereas annulment
proceedings theoretically may guard against deviations from ritual,
binding interpretations theoretically create a remedy for the
development of incoherent doctrine and provide an opportunity for
politically accountable actors-the NAFTA Parties-to have the final
word on matters of treaty construction. In practice, however,
annulment proceedings conducted by the municipal courts of
interested parties, and the adoption of binding interpretations by
interested parties, have raised serious questions of legitimacy.
Whether one blames the NAFTA Parties or the treaty's structure, the
fact remains that annulment proceedings and binding interpretations
have become the most recent, and perhaps the most serious,
development in the legitimacy crisis of NAFTA's investment chapter.
D. Legitimacy and the Constitutional Dimension: Relationships
Among Tribunals, Courts, and the Free Trade Commission
Observers have begun to describe Chapter 11 in terms of a
constitutional process2 44 similar in kind, although not degree, to that
of the European Union. Therefore, one must address, however
briefly, legitimacy concerns raised by the constitutional relationship
among Chapter 11 tribunals, municipal courts, and the Free Trade
Commission. Experience shows that constitutional systems will
encounter legitimacy crises unless they reach a settlement that
clearly defines the respective powers and competence of constituent
acted "largely to address the Pope tribunal's failure to heed the NAFTA Parties' prior
statements regarding the interpretation of Article 1105(1)").
242. See David A. Gantz, Government-to-Government Dispute Resolution Under
NAFTA's Chapter 20: A Commentary on the Process, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 481, 490-92
(2000) (indicating that the Commission lacks the capacity to act independently of the
NAFTA Parties); Paterson, supra note 3, at 110 (warning that the Commission's
interpretations might become "a route for political interference in tribunal decisions").
243. FRANCK, supra note 71, at 85. See also Brower, Beware the Jabberwock,
supra note 2, at 485-87; Brower, supra note 62, at 11.
244. See Afilalo, supra note 2, at 3-4, 6-8, 54; Clarkson, supra note 2, at 369,
373-76, 379. See also David Schneiderman, NAFTA's Takings Rule: American
Constitutionalism Comes to Canada, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 499, 503 (1996) (indicating
that "NAFTA has altered significantly the constitutional make-up of the Canadian
state").
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bodies. 245 Unfortunately, Chapter 11 allocates limited powers to
three decisionmakers but fails to establish clear standards or
processes to determine the limits of each one's authority. As
explained below, this indeterminate separation of powers creates
additional concerns, which complicate all of the problems discussed
above.
In one respect, Chapter 11 tribunals have clearly limited
powers-their jurisdiction extends only to investment disputes that
allege violations of the disciplines set forth in Section A of NAFTA's
investment chapter.246 Article 1136, in turn, provides for "revision"
or "annulment" of awards by municipal courts at the seat of
arbitration, but fails to define those concepts, thereby creating
ambiguity about the extent to which tribunals must share their
decision-making powers with municipal courts. According to one
view, this permits courts to exercise any degree of review permitted
by municipal law.247 Because that law may differ among, and even
within, the three NAFTA Parties, 248 that approach provides no
determinate, uniform, or permanent settlement regarding the
competence of tribunals and courts.
Others believe that the NAFTA Parties' agreement to "final" and
"binding" arbitration precludes judicial review of the merits, thereby
limiting annulment proceedings to an examination of the record for
gross procedural defects, such as decisions that exceed the tribunal's
jurisdiction. 249  When required to assume the existence of such
limiting principles, however, the NAFTA Parties250  and one
245. See Brewer, supra note 83, at 578 (quoting DAVID MCKAY, DESIGNING
EUROPE: COMPARATIVE LESSONS FROM THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 150 (2001)). See also
Clarkson, supra note 2, at 374 ("Constitutions define the parameters of formal rule-
making institutions . . . [and] . . . also set limits on the powers of the institutions that
they create."); Hyde, supra note 70, at 401 ("What a government of limited powers
needs . . . is some means of satisfying the people that it has taken all steps humanly
possible to stay within its powers. That is the condition of its legitimacy, and its
legitimacy ... is the condition of its life.").
246. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1116(1), 1117(1). See also Brower, Beware
the Jabberwock, supra note 2, at 467; Weiler, supra note 3, at 408.
247. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 441-47 (discussing judicial review of Chapter
11 awards and apparently assuming that municipal law places the only limitations on
such review).
248. See, e.g., COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 203, at 259 (explaining that the
"availability of recourse against an award in municipal courts is a matter for the local law,
and there are substantial variations between different States').
249. See Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 2, at 479-84; Brower,
Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2, at 75-78.
250. See S.D. Myers, Canada's Memorandum of Fact and Law, supra note 59,
paras. 135, 137, 147, 158-59, 173-74, 196, 200-06; S.D. Myers, Mexico's Memorandum of
Fact and Law, supra note 59, paras. 4, 19, 26-29, 47-52, 60-61, 101-06, 129-42; Mexico's
Outline of Argument (Metalclad), supra note 23, paras. 249-50, 262; Canada's Outline
of Argument (Metalclad), supra note 58, paras. 31-32, 58-62.
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reviewing court 251 have responded by treating misinterpretations of
Chapter 11 as a form of jurisdictional error.
In either case, the point is that Chapter 11 places indeterminate
limits on the power of municipal courts to supervise the arbitral
process. When combined with popular concerns about the legitimacy
of Chapter 11 tribunals, this ambiguity encourages courts to second-
guess decisions made by tribunals. As noted above, such textual
indeterminacy might be tolerable if there were a legitimate process
for identifying the point at which courts overstep their authority.
252
While the Author has suggested that, under certain circumstances, a
second Chapter 11 tribunal could examine the propriety of judicial
review, 253 others have disagreed. 254 Furthermore, even if Chapter 11
tribunals could provide a second layer of international review, those
decisions would remain subject to annulment by municipal courts at
the seat of arbitration, which presumably would be unlikely to honor
awards condemning review by municipal courts. 255 Thus, in the
absence of clear rules defining their relative authority-or procedures
for creating such rules-legitimacy concerns seem likely to plague the
relationship between Chapter 11 tribunals and municipal courts.
Like Chapter 11 tribunals, the Free Trade Commission has
certain clearly limited powers. Thus, the Commission may adopt
binding interpretations of NAFTA but not amendments, which
require more formal procedures and a higher degree of political
scrutiny. 256 Yet NAFTA's text leaves two major ambiguities about
the Commission's authority relative to that of Chapter 11 tribunals.
For example, the treaty does not specify whether the Commission's
interpretations apply only prospectively, or whether they also apply
to arbitrations already underway. Under these circumstances, some
251. See Metalclad, Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, supra note
58, paras. 61-75; Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 2, at 479-84.
252. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
253. See Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 2, at 482-84; Brower, supra
note 10, at 82-84.
254. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 455-58.
255. See Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2, at 84.
256. Compare NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131(2) (authorizing the Free Trade
Commission to adopt binding interpretations of NAFTA provisions), with id. art. 2202
(permitting the NAFTA Parties to adopt modifications of or additions to NAFTA
provisions, which take effect only after approval "in accordance with the applicable
legal procedures of each Party"). See also Pope & Talbot, Award in Respect of
Damages, supra note 51, paras. 17-19; Methanex, Claimant's Letter Brief, supra note
68, at 19-20; Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Joint Reply of Claimants to the
Counter-Memorial of the United States (June 8, 2001), para. 288, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6328.doc; Beauvais, supra note 2, at 288
n.194.
Although it may sometimes be difficult to draw practical distinctions between the
two, interpretations theoretically clarify ambiguity while amendments alter
substantive obligations. See Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2, at 56-57 n.71;
Soloway & Broadhurst, supra note 2, at 397.
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observers have come to view the Free Trade Commission as a
legislative body257 that has the power to formulate general rules of
application but not to dictate the outcome of specific disputes.
25 8
Others see the Commission more as an adjudicative body that can
wrest the power of interpretation from tribunals in particular
disputes notwithstanding the troubling fact that the Commission's
members have a material interest in every dispute.2
59
In addition, because the "distinction between interpretation and
amendment is not always easy to draw,"26 0 the Commission's work
product may often be vulnerable to allegations that it crosses the line
between bona fide interpretation and ultra vires amendment.26 1
Unfortunately, the procedures for resolving such claims are as
indeterminate as the standards to be applied. Thus, while Chapter
11 tribunals may claim the right to determine if a text qualifies as an
257. Clarkson, supra note 2, at 385.
258. See Pope & Talbot, Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 51, para. 50;
Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 2, at 485-86; Brower, Empire Strikes Back,
supra note 2, at 56 n.70; Brower, supra note 62, at 11; Weiler, supra note 3, at 427.
259. See U.S. Post-Hearing Submission (ADF), supra note 62, at 8-9 (indicating
that the Free Trade Commission has the "plenary power [to] overrule[ I a tribunal's
authority.., in deciding.., investment disputes" and that tribunals play a "subsidiary
role" vis-A-vis the Commission). See also Brower & Steven, supra note 40, at 200
(describing Canada's support for interpretive statements as part of an attempt by the
NAFTA Parties "to take the power of decision away" from Chapter 11 tribunals).
The debate about the Commission's role is further complicated by the fact that it
clearly has an adjudicative role in one narrow area: when a disputing NAFTA Party
claims that a challenged measure falls within the scope of a reservation or exception
established by Annexes I-IV, tribunals must submit that question to the Commission
for a binding decision. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1132. However, because a draft
of Chapter 11 would have explicitly extended the Commission's adjudicative role to all
interpretive questions in Chapter 11 disputes, because the final treaty text explicitly
gives the Commission an adjudicative role only with respect to the interpretation of
Annexes, and because it describes that role as "further to" the Commission's power to
issue interpretative statements of general application, the better view seems to be that
this last power does not encompass the authority to resolve particular investment
disputes. See id. arts. 1131, 1132. See also Gary N. Horlick & Alicia L. Marti, NAFTA
Chapter 11B-A Private Right of Action to Enforce Market Access Through Investments,
14 J. INT'L ARB. 43, 49 & n.47 (1997) (discussing the Free Trade Commission's
adjudicative role under the draft and final texts of Chapter 11).
260. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 193 (2000). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325
cmt. c (1987) (explaining that the distinction between interpretation and amendment
"may be imperceptible in some instances").
261. See Pope & Talbot, Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 51, paras. 21,
47 & n.37; Methanex, Second Opinion of Professor Sir Robert Jennings, supra note 68,
at 4-5; Claimant's Post Hearing Submission (ADF), supra note 68, para. 49; Investor's
Reply on Competence and Liability (ADF), supra note 238, para. 215; Methanex,
Claimant's Letter Brief, supra note 68, at 17-20; Brower, Beware the Jabberwock,
supra note 2, at 486 n.142; Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 2, at 56-57 n.71;
Weiler, supra note 3, at 429; Mann & von Moltke, manuscript, supra note 3, at 13.
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"interpretation" or an "amendment,"262 the NAFTA Parties contend
that ad hoc tribunals have no such authority and must accept the
Free Trade Commission's designation as conclusive. 263 Given the
absence of clear rules defining their relative authority-or even a
clear procedure for creating such rules-legitimacy concerns seem
likely to plague the relationship between the Commission and
Chapter 11 tribunals.
To further complicate matters, legitimacy crises between the
Commission and Chapter 11 tribunals seem likely to feed back into
the legitimacy crises between tribunals and municipal courts. For
example, if a tribunal were to decide that a purported interpretation
actually constituted an ultra vires amendment, the relevant NAFTA
Party would almost certainly seek annulment of the award.264 At the
urging of its own government, the relevant court might determine
that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction26 5 and might, therefore,
annul the award. Thereafter, the claimant and, possibly, a second
Chapter 11 tribunal might characterize such annulment proceedings
as an unlawful intrusion onto the merits of legal and factual
determinations made in the award. 266 Such cascading allegations of
ultra vires conduct have no logical end.
Although one might, with time, identify additional flaws in the
constitutional structure of NAFTA's investment chapter, it remains
sufficient to observe that the treaty fails to define the relative powers
of tribunals, courts, and the Free Trade Commission, or to establish
clear processes for articulating such rules. Under the circumstances,
legitimacy concerns are likely to permeate the constitutional
relationships among those institutions and to compound the
legitimacy crisis generated by their individual shortcomings. These
facts raise grave doubts about Chapter I l's long-term viability and its
suitability as a model for the FTAA's investment chapter.267
262. See Pope & Talbot, Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 51, paras. 23-
24; Brower, supra note 62, at 10-11; Weiler, supra note 3, at 429-30.
263. See Pope & Talbot, Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 51, para. 22;
U.S. Post-Hearing Submission (ADF), supra note 62, at 8-12; Methanex, Canada's
Third Article 1128 Submission, supra note 63, para. 10.
264. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 455 (warning that "it will be an unusual
tribunal (and one that invites judicial review) that characterizes the Commission's
interpretations as anything other than bona fide") (first emphasis added).
265. See id. at 454.
266. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
267. The author recognizes that many supporters of Chapter 11 will disagree
with this assessment. See Clarkson, supra note 2, at 385 ("For some, [Chapter 11] is
growing healthily ... From this perspective, any intervention would be a mistake
likely to cause more harm than it prevents."); Soloway & Broadhurst, supra note 2, at
404 ("What [Chapter 11] really needs is a little time ... to sort [itself] out.").
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V. LESSONS FOR THE FTAA AND OTHER MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT
REGIMES
Despite the Author's growing pessimism about the prospects for
Chapter 11, hope for the future remains: "If legitimacy can be
studied, it can also be deliberately nourished" and fortified in the
FTAA and other multilateral investment regimes. 268 The success of
this endeavor depends, first, on the adaptation of Chapter 11 to meet
the sources of perceived illegitimacy 269-namely, incoherent
doctrine-plus, at a minimum, either the lack of conformity to
historical models or the failure to incorporate fundamental values of
the governed community. 270 Furthermore, while future investment
regimes must strive to achieve greater legitimacy than Chapter 11,
that improvement should not come at too great an expense to the
specific goals of investment regimes, 27 1 including the following: (1)
the creation of predictable commercial frameworks for business
planning, (2) substantial increases in investment opportunities, and
(3) the establishment of effective and internationally neutral
procedures for resolving investment disputes before impartial
tribunals. 272 Because the many proponents of reform so far have not
undertaken the task, the remainder of this Article measures their
proposals against the criteria just mentioned.
According to some, salvation requires the adoption of rules or
exceptions that possess absolute textual clarity. 273  Although
perfectly clear rules might theoretically inhibit the formation of
incoherent doctrine, one may doubt the ability of negotiators to
capture a complex balance of stakeholder interests in simple rules as
opposed to more open-textured standards. 274 Even if it were possible
268. Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 70, at 711.
269. See Caron, supra note 70, at 561.
270. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text (identifying predictable
operation as a necessary foundation, but suggesting that the legitimacy of
international legal regimes may also require either conformity to historical practice or
incorporation of fundamental values).
271. See Caron, supra note 70, at 566 (arguing that improvements to the
legitimacy of the Security Council should not come at the expense of the institution's
effective operation).
272. See supra notes 4-6, 21 and accompanying text.
273. See Mann & von Moltke, manuscript, supra note 3, at 25 ("Disciplines must
be clear, not vague. They must have a finite range of interpretation, rather than be
open-ended."). See also Ganguly, supra note 17, at 166 (supporting the adoption of
treaty "provisions ... making reservations or exceptions for public health concerns,"
including "clear carve-outs within the text of treaties").
274. See Price, supra note 117, at 111 (explaining that negotiators of Chapter 11
tried to formulate a provision "that would distinguish between legitimate regulation... and
a taking," but "quickly gave up" on trying to resolve a complex issue that had troubled the
U.S. Supreme Court for "over 150 years'). See also Soloway, Challenge of Private Party
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as an exercise in definitional skills, the use of simple rules to deal
with complex matters often produces absurd results at the margins,
creating in turn a sense of constructive indeterminacy and a
paradoxical reduction of legitimacy.27 5 Furthermore, assuming that
clearer rules actually produced coherent results, the foregoing
discussion indicates that a legal regime's predictable operation may
not by itself create widespread perceptions of legitimacy. 276 More is
required-namely, conformity to historical practice or the
incorporation of fundamental values. 277 Unfortunately, clearer rules
and exceptions do not create pedigrees for tribunals or enhance their
propensity to follow rituals. Nor do they necessarily introduce
principles of accountability, transparency, or democratic participation
into investor-state arbitration. Under these circumstances, while one
may debate the feasibility of adopting clearer rules, one cannot
seriously contend that it represents a complete solution to the
legitimacy crisis in Chapter 11.
Others support the transfer of jurisdiction over investor-state
disputes to municipal courts, citing the positive role that they have
played in the European Union. 278 Even the proponents of this model
acknowledge, however, that the tendency of national courts to
support their own governments would require oversight by an
international court or appellate body.279  To be sure, the EU's
experience offers a pedigree for reliance on municipal courts to
cement a legal regime among developed states that have transparent
and accountable judiciaries with similar traditions, unmarred by bias
or inefficiency. When one moves beyond the highly integrated
community of Western Europe, however, many of these assumptions
no longer hold true. Thus, when applied to NAFTA, the FTAA or
other multilateral regimes involving a mixture of developed and
Participation, supra note 3, at 14 (acknowledging that it would be difficult to devise any
formulation that "would be so determinative as not to raise interpretive issues in specific
cases'); Terri L. Lilley, Keeping NAFTA "Green" for Investors and the Environment, 75 S.
CAL. L. REv. 727, 743 (2002) (observing that environmentalists want to exempt 'legitimate
environmental regulations" from the disciplines of Chapter 11, but suggesting that
identification of 'legitimate" regulations would still be subject to a significant degree of
judicial appreciation).
275. See FRANCK, supra note 71, at 67-83.
276. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
277. See id.
278. See Afilalo, supra note 2, at 9, 45, 52. See also Paterson, supra note 3, at
122 (entertaining the possibility of litigating international trade and investment
disputes before domestic municipal courts). In this regard, one might also mention the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, which included an investment chapter,
but did not provide for investor-state arbitration. See PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC
PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 7; Clarkson, supra note 2, at 376; Gantz, supra note 3, at
340-41. Given the independence, expertise, and similarities of the U.S. and Canadian
benches, each state apparently had confidence that the treaty norms would be
incorporated into (and applied by) the other's municipal legal system. See id.
279. See Afilalo, supra note 2, at 52.
[VOL. 3637
20031 STRUCTURE LEGITIMACY AND NA FTAS INVESTMENT CHAPTER 89
developing states, the involvement of national courts would not
necessarily promote accountability, transparency, or democratic
participation. Nor would it necessarily serve the more specific goals
of investment regimes, such as the effective resolution of disputes
before impartial tribunals using internationally neutral
procedures. 28 0  Furthermore, while appellate review by an
international court offers a theoretical measure of protection, it
provides little comfort to investors who may have to face two or three
instances of proceedings before the biased, inefficient, or unfamiliar
courts of their host states.28 1  Therefore, while the transfer of
jurisdiction to municipal courts might enhance the legitimacy of
investment regimes made exclusively of developed, relatively
homogenous states, it holds less promise with respect to investment
regimes involving a mixture of developed and developing states.28 2
Additional proposals contemplate the transfer of jurisdiction for
investment disputes to the more traditional process of state-to-state
arbitration before ad hoc tribunals.28 3 While observers predict that
state-to-state arbitration would reduce the number of frivolous
claims, 28 4 they do not always explain why. The fact is that states
rarely espouse claims of any sort 28 5 and, when they do, often base
decisions on political expediency as opposed to the merits of claims. 28 6
It does not take much imagination to realize that this system does not
alleviate, but compounds, the legitimacy concerns surrounding
Chapter 11. For example, while state-to-state arbitration before ad
hoc tribunals may have a pedigree, it does not necessarily promote
accountability, transparency, or democratic participation. Nor does it
280. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 5-6
(explaining that the "presumption behind the [investor-state arbitration] process is
that foreign investors do not generally receive fair treatment in domestic courts in
developing countries when complaining of a government action"); Brower & Steven,
supra note 40, at 196 (observing that "the fundamental reason that the great majority
of modern investment protection treaties have opted for international adjudication is
that domestic courts are often in fact, and, just as important, usually are perceived to
be, biased against alien investors"). See also Schneider, supra note 73, at 717
(indicating that the investor-state arbitration regime appeals to investors who are
"concerned with the potential bias, inefficiency, or unfamiliarity of foreign courts").
281. See Brower & Steven, supra note 40, at 196 ("Investor confidence ... is not
furthered by requiring domestic litigation.").
282. See Gantz, supra note 242, at 487 (concluding that the "resolution of
investor-host government disputes through local courts has been highly
unsatisfactory").
283. See Beauvais, supra note 2, at 294; Ferguson, supra note 40, at 518;
Ganguly, supra note 17, at 166; Loritz, supra note 47, at 548.
284. Ferguson, supra note 40, at 519; Loritz, supra note 47, at 548.
285. See Camponovo, supra note 40, at 189 (stating that "[c]ases of espousal are
rare"). See also Gantz, supra note 242, at 524 (observing that the NAFTA Parties have
"sparingly" pursued state-to-state arbitration).
286. See Brower & Steven, supra note 40, at 197; Byrne, supra note 49, at 418-
29, 429; Camponovo, supra note 40, at 189.
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promote the development of coherent doctrine, although the smaller
volume of claims may retard the appearance of incoherence. To the
contrary, by committing the resolution of investment disputes to a
discretionary, political process, state-to-state arbitration introduces a
new layer of incoherence with respect to the pursuit of meritorious
claims. 28 7  From investors' perspective, state-to-state arbitration
operates less predictably and legitimately than investor-state
arbitration. 28 8 It also undermines the more specific goal of creating
procedures for the effective resolution of investment disputes. In
short, state-to-state arbitration offers a poor solution to the
legitimacy crisis of Chapter 11.
Substantially more promising are proposals to create a standing
court or arbitral tribunal based on the model of the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) or the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.28 9 In
theory, a permanent judicial body of limited membership could
promote the development of consistent doctrine and could adopt
working procedures that enhance accountability and transparency.
Yet such a body would raise at least one concern about legitimacy and
one concern about the specific goals of investment regimes. With
regard to the former, it seems that most observers have overlooked
the problem of "control. '290  While international adjudication
traditionally has followed a single-instance procedure, the lack of
secondary control enables tribunals of limited authority to deviate
from ritual and to exceed the boundaries of their competence. 291
Although the NAFTA Parties enlisted municipal courts to exercise
judicial control over Chapter 11 tribunals,292 this experiment so far
has proven to be an impediment to the legitimate operation of
NAFTA's investment chapter.293 Therefore, to maximize legitimacy,
287. See Byrne, supra note 49, at 419 (explaining that if a "private party ...
must depend on government intervention for the enforcement of international treaties,"
it "cannot count on a consistent application of laws or prosecution of legal rights").
288. See id. at 416, 419 (concluding that the placement of control over claims
into "the hands of... discretionary government agents.., decreases predictability" for
investors).
289. See W. Michael Reisman, Control Mechanisms in International Dispute
Resolution, 2 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 129, 136-37 (1994); Loritz, supra note 47, at 548. See also
Gantz, supra note 242, at 527-28 (rejecting the concept of an international trade court
as politically unpalatable, but supporting the creation of a single-instance arbitral
tribunal having a permanent membership of nine individuals who would sit in three-
person chambers).
290. See Reisman, supra note 289, at 129 (observing that controls still receive
"insufficient attention" in the design of procedures for transnational dispute
resolution). See also Dodge, supra note 183, at 191 (identifying the need for a "system
of control" for Chapter 11 arbitrations, but not developing a concrete proposal).
291. See Reisman, supra note 289, at 130.
292. See supra notes 36-37, 203 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 209-23 and accompanying text.
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a second instance of judicial control or review at the international
level seems in order.
With respect to the more specific goal of creating effective
procedures for resolving disputes, the Author finds it unlikely that a
single tribunal could adequately and seasonably establish the facts
and shepherd a coherent body of doctrine in the full range of disputes.
After all, these disputes have reached almost 20 claims involving
complex questions of judicial and bureaucratic procedure,
environmental regulations, conservation programs, and measures to
protect public health and safety. 294 Such pressures would inevitably
manifest themselves in the tribunal's jurisprudence, perhaps in the
form of incorrect decisions or undue delay. Neither prospect seems
particularly inviting to investors and their host states.
Given the Author's concerns about a single instance of
adjudication before a standing tribunal, the most encouraging
alternative may be to retain a first instance of investor-state
arbitration before ad hoc tribunals, but to add a second instance
-comprising plenary review of legal questions by a standing appellate
tribunal.2 95 Under these circumstances, the ad hoc tribunals could
resolve disputes efficiently by concentrating on development of
factual records and application of the law. With a small and stable
membership, the appellate tribunal could focus on reviewing
adherence to ritual at the first instance and supervising the
development of a coherent body of law among the various tribunals.
Needless to say, both instances should enhance transparency by
incorporating a system of public disclosure and access. 2 9 6
With a standing appellate body of recognized expertise and
probably a developed sense of accountability available to correct legal
errors, the states parties would presumably feel less inclined to use
political intervention by the Free Trade Commission or its equivalent
under the FTAA to shape the outcome of particular disputes. 297
Furthermore, as NAFTA's three-party investment regime expands to
294. Cf. Schneider, supra note 73, at 765-66 (expressing concern that global
membership could overwhelm a single-instance supranational court and predicting, for
example, that the ECJ would require "further screening mechanisms ... or additional
lower courts").
295. See Abbott, supra note 64, at 308; Dodge, supra note 67, at 918.
296. See Cremades & Cairns, supra note 3, at 197 (suggesting that the
"damaging allegations of excessive secrecy could be met in part by the recognition
within the dispute resolution clauses in multilateral and bilateral investment treaties
of a public right of information"); Gantz, supra note 242, at 525 (concluding that "much
of the aura of secrecy could be resolved quickly if all the governments would use their
existing Secretariat website to set forth a brief summary of the matters set for
arbitration, publish the parties' submissions promptly after they are submitted, and
open the hearings to the public").
297. To eliminate completely the possibility of such intervention and to reinforce
the Commission's role as a legislative body, its mandate should be revised to forbid the
adoption of retroactive interpretations designed to resolve ongoing disputes.
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the entire Western hemisphere, it will become increasingly difficult
for its political organs to agree on binding interpretive statements as
a means of promoting coherent doctrine. Thus, for multilateral
investment regimes with a broad membership, an appellate tribunal
may be essential for correcting legal errors in specific cases and for
the maintenance of systemic coherence.
Although an appellate tribunal has many advantages, its
supporters have not, to the Author's knowledge, addressed at least
two problems related to the specific goals of investment regimes and
one problem related to legitimacy. With regard to the former,
effective dispute resolution requires finality and enforceability.
Although the prospect of a second instance would necessarily affect
investors' expectations of finality, the countervailing benefits to
legitimacy would be substantial and the consequences would be less
deleterious than current fears of heightened review by municipal
courts. Furthermore, treaty texts could discourage abuse of the
appeals process by requiring appellants to pay respondents' costs and
attorney fees following unsuccessful appeals. With respect to.
enforceability, treaty texts could no longer refer enforcement matters
to the New York and Inter-American Conventions and their
concomitant process of domestic judicial review, 298 but would have to
provide for automatic enforcement of appellate tribunal decisions-
and decisions not timely appealed-in the manner contemplated by
the ICSID Convention. 299
With respect to legitimacy, the fact remains that an appellate
tribunal has a judicial, as opposed to a political, character and,
therefore, necessarily provides limited opportunities for democratic
participation. Democratic participation may, however, be
incorporated into future investment regimes through a modified
version of the Free Trade Commission. The principle of democratic
participation requires modification of the Commission's working
procedures. Instead of adopting interpretations without warning,
public consultation, or even a reasoned decision, as it did in July
2001,300 the Commission's members should establish multi-
stakeholder national advisory groups to provide more public
involvement in, and supervision of, the development of proposals for
action by the Commission. 301 Only by doing so may the states parties
ensure that the Commission fulfills its promise of supplying an
298. See New York Convention, supra note 28, art. V; Inter-American
Convention, supra note 29, art. 5.
299. See ICSID Convention, supra note 24, arts. 53, 54.
300. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
301. In this respect, Canada deserves recognition as the only NAFTA Party to
have established such an advisory group. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, NAFTA'S
CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 9, 10, 59; Paterson, supra note 3, at 106; Soloway,
Challenge of Private Party Participation, supra note 3, at 13.
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accountable, transparent, and democratic tool for guiding the
evolution of a coherent and desirable investment regime.30 2
In short, while superior proposals may emerge in due course, it
appears that the continuation of ad hoc arbitration, followed by
review by a standing appellate tribunal, and supervised by an
accountable, transparent, and publicly accessible Free Trade
Commission, would best serve the combined interests of promoting
legitimacy and foreign investment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Chapter 11 finds itself in the midst of a legitimacy crisis, in
which claimants, arbitral tribunals, and the NAFTA Parties accuse
each other of illegitimate conduct during the course of resolving
investment disputes. Such widespread perceptions of illegitimacy
pose a serious threat to the long-term survival of NAFTA's
investment chapter and its suitability as a model for other
multilateral investment treaties. Upon examination, the sources of
illegitimacy seem obvious. Treaty provisions lack a substantial
measure of textual clarity. Ad hoc tribunals based on the model of
commercial arbitration have generated incoherent doctrine on a key
provision. They also lack a pedigree accepted as valid by the
governed community and may seem prone to depart from ritual due
to inexperience. Furthermore, by their very nature, ad hoc tribunals
tend to be relatively less accountable, transparent, and accessible to
democratic processes than permanent tribunals.
Turning to the involvement of municipal courts in annulment
proceedings and the Free Trade Commission in adopting interpretive
statements, one finds that the NAFTA Parties have not resolved the
problem of doctrinal incoherence, but instead have raised new
concerns by transforming important decision-making rituals into
opportunities to promote narrow self-interest. Furthermore, the Free
Trade Commission has adopted working procedures that undermine
the principles of accountability, transparency, and democratic
participation. Compounding all of the foregoing problems, Chapter
11 creates a sort of constitutional indeterminacy by failing to fix clear
rules, or procedures for establishing rules, on the allocation of
decision-making power among arbitral tribunals, municipal courts,
and the Free Trade Commission.
While possibly life-threatening, Chapter l's ailments remain
capable of treatment. Among the various prescriptions, continuation
of ad hoc arbitration, followed by review by a standing appellate
tribunal, and supervised by an accountable, transparent, and publicly
302. See Caron, supra note 70, at 588 (expressing hope that the "opportunity to
participate[ ] can resolve.., concerns about illegitimacy").
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accessible Free Trade Commission, seems best suited to promote a
legitimate investment regime, which will in turn provide the
"lifeblood of globalization. °30 3
303. Cremades & Cairns, supra note 3, at 174.
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